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CHAPTER I 
.' VALU~, THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
~he first question that the thinking man desires an-
swered about any subject which he may be inclined to investi-
gate is whether his efforts are gOing to be worthwhile. With 
regard to the problem of value theory, Doctor Fulton Sheen 
assures us that there is no danger of exaggerating the place 
which it holds in the world today: Wilbur M. Urban, an out-
standing non-Scholastic valuist, also remarks upon the shift 
in modern metaphysics from the study of being to that of value~ 
Even more important, however, has been the shift from the the-
3 
ory of knowledge to the theory of value. "Value", which but 
a few decades ago would have suggested nothing more than a 
term in economics, is now perhaps the most essential feature 
of non-Scholastic PhilOSOPhY~ ~here is no field to which its 
influence does not extend, and its effects have been every-
5 
where tremendous. 
But in no other instance has this influence been so 
conspicuous as in the field of religion. Here, as we shall 
see in vhapter VII, its consequences have been of the highest 
import and have affected the ethical beliefs of our age to 
their deepest foundations. rteligion for the modern theorist 
is no longer the humble recognition and service of a ~upreme 
Creator and Lawgiver Who mercifully provides for His creatures, 
_. 
2 
6 but is now "a faith in the conservation of values". By 
"faith", however, the modern philosophers do not intend'-the 
theological virtue which is the foundation of all supernatural 
religion, but rather a vague emotional confidence or senti-
mental opinion. ~his modern attitude towards God is perhaps 
the most cogent argument for studying the philosophy of value, 
since it vitally affects t. most important concern of our 
race. 
OUr purpose in this thesis is not to discuss all or 
even many of the various levels in the scale of values, but 
rather to confine our treatment to the analysis of the funda-
mental concept of value. Moreover, it will be necessary to 
limit our discussion to the leading British-and American ex-
ponents of the theory of value, since an attempt to include 
a discussion of equivalent continental doctrines would make 
our work too discursive. OUr method of procedure, therefore, 
will be as follows: first, to present in digest a non-com-
mittal exposition of the non-Scholastic theory; secondly, to 
explain the Scholastic doctrine on value; thirdly, to criti-
cize the scientific and metaphysical origins of non-Scholas-
tic theory in the light of Thomistic principles; fourthly, 
in the light of these same principles to point out certain 
inconsistencies and fallacious conclusions of the non-Scholas-
tic theory; and fifth)y, by applying the doctrine of non-
Scholastic philosophy to another science, namely that of re-
ligion# to show that its consequences are inacceptable and 
contrar 7 to the evidence of objective realit7_ ~ Last of all. 
we shall offer some suggestions concerning the prospective 
outcome of this all-important problem of value_ 
3 
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER I 
.' 1. F. J. Sheen, Religion Without .Q:2g, p. 60, sqq. 
2. W. M. Urban, "Value Theory and Esthetics", Philosophy 
Today, p. 54 
3. J. E. Russell, "Truth as Value and the Value of Truth", 
Mind, XXI (1912), pp. 538-539 
R. W. Sellars, "Cognition and Valuation", Philosophical 
Review, XXXV (1926), pp. 124-144 
M. H. Moore, "Truth and the Interest Theory of Value", 
Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), p. 171 
4. The term "value" has long been employed in economics in 
several definite senses, as for instance, exchange 
value, marginal value, price value, etc. For a com-
plete discussion of the economic uses of the term, cf. 
E. S. Burke, Political Economy, pp. 37-44. 
The fundamental definition of economic value proposed 
in these pages - namely, "the desirability of the 
economic utility of an object" - is but a particular 
application of the general idea of value that this the-
sis aims to defend. 
5. For the effect of subjective value theory on various 
fields, ct. 
on art: F. J. Sheen, Religion Without ~, 
pp. 263-269 - impressionism and the 
cult of the indistinct 
on economics: L. R. Ward, Values ~ Reality, 
Chapter XIII, "The Value of Money" 
on psychology: R. B. Perry, General Theory 2! 
Value - "interest" and motor-affective 
states of being 
on science: Cf. Footnote 2 to Chap. IV of this 
thesis ----
on sociology: R. W. Sellars, Principles and Prob-
.!!.!!!. 9.! Philosophy, pp. 383-490 ::-Society 
as value 
6. A. Hoffding, Philosophy of neligion, p. 6, as quoted by 
F. J. Sheen, Ril1S16n-With6Ut ~, p. 64 
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CHAPTER II 
DOCTRINES OF '1'HE LEADING BRITISH AND AMERICAN .' 
NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORISTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief, un-
critical exposition of the doctrines of the leading British 
and American non-Scholastic value theorists. I say "uncrit-
ical", because we cannot properly evaluate the non-Scholas-
tic theories, until we have discovered some sound norms of 
criticism in the Scholastic position. Perhaps, the order 
which is used in arranging these modern theories, may be 
regarded as a kind of criticism. Without order, however, it 
would be impossible to make any progress at all. And in this 
matter order is especially important, since the lack of it 
is one of the chief difficulties of the non-Scholastic posi-
tion today. It is a lack so conspicuous that the analysis 
of the value theory has justly been called a study in con-
fusion. For instance, many of the moderns do not distinguish 
between value and values and talk of intermediate and secon-
dary values as if these were fundamental. Some of them even 
go so far as to hold or seem to nold contradictory opinions, 
which cannot be reconciled if taken literally. 
Since we must find some basiS of division, the best 
way of doing this seems to be to consider the facts of the 
value situation and to draw up our categories according to 
p-__ ----------------------------------------~I 
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them. In the act of valuing, three elemental facts appear to 
stand out most prominently - the subject who values, t~ ob-
ject that is valued, and the relation between them. Therefore, 
classifying the modern non-Scholastics according to the ele-
ment wherein they make value reside, we have: the subjective 
school, which places value primarily in the valuing subject; 
the relational school, which places it in the relation between, 
the. subject and its object; and the objective school, which 
places it in the object itself. This last group must be again 
subdivided into those who mean objective in a sense akin to 
that accepted by ~cholasticism and those who either mean sub-
jective or say something that is altogether impeaaible. 
A - Subjective School 
1. Ralph Barton PerrI 
We shall take Dr. Perry as the first and chief repre-
sentative of the subjective school in America, since he haa 
written so much on the subject of value theory and has en-
joyed great influence ~ong his fellow philosophers. His 
outstanding importance is also demonstrated by the fact that 
it is his doctrine which is the main object of attack by the 
leading English-speaking Gatholic philosophers in this field. 
In his earlier days, Mr. Perry preferred ttdesire" as 
the keystone to his theory of value, but about 1914 changed 
JIII"""' --------------------------------------------------------~7~1 
over to "interest n as the central fact.l He tells us that the 
first problem of value theory is to define the term "value", 
which he does as follows: 
"Value in the generic sense has to do with a certain con-
stant which we may call ~ or interest .2 •••••• Value 
consists in the fulfillment of interest." 
It is worth noting that he here uses the words "has to do with 
a certain constant". These words as yet do not make clear 
whether "bias or interest" is value or merely has to do with 
value. In the next sentence the verb t1consists" leaves fur-
ther room for doubt as to just what value really is. 
But if his earlier definition of value was tantal1z-
ingly vague, Mr. Perry twelve years later clarifies the issue 
by taking the following definite stand: 
"It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-
affective life, this state, ~, attitude ~ disposition 
of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the 
name of interest. ThiS, then, we take to be tlB orig1.nal 
source and constant feature of all value. That Which is 
an object of interest is invested with value. Any object, 
whatever it be, acquires value when any interest-; what-
ever it be, is taken in it ••••• In other words, Aristotle 
was fundamentally mistaken when he said, that a thing1s 
iapparent good f makes it an object of appetite, so its 
real good makes it the object of 'rational desire l • By 
the same token ~pinoza was ~damentally correct when he 
said that iinno case do we strive for, wish for, long 
for, or desire anything because we deem it to be good, 
but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because 
we strive for it •••••••••• I • n3 
In this quotation are contained the chief features 
of Mr. Perry's doctrine: its subjective and psychological 
character, its emphasis on interest or motor-affective atti-
~~ ..------------------------------~--~ 8 
tude as the central fact of all value theory, and its disa-
greement with the Scholastic position on good. Elsewhe~e also 
he insists in opposition to G. E. Moore that goodness is not 
an indefinable quality independent of consciousness and ex-
plicitly states that there is nothing so precious that its 
value would not disappear if all needs, likings, and aspira-
tions were extinguishe~ Moreover, he objects to the old 
narrow triumvirate of the Scholastics and wishes to substi-
tute "an elastic polytheism for the conventional trinitarian-
ism of the worshippers of the true, the beautiful, and the 
good," yet, on the same page he tells us that "attitudes of 
liking and disliking" is a sufficiently broad term to replace 
the old categories.5 
In a remarkable part of the General ~heorl ~ Value 
(pages 115-124), Mr. ~erry seemB to take three different 
stands on the location of value. He states first, that value 
is nany object of interest" or "that special characteristiC" 
~f ~~e object in which interest is taken; secondly, that value 
is "the peculiar relation" between subject and object; and 
thirdly, that valuing is value itself. ~assages from these 
pages could well classify him as subjective, relational, or 
objective, but assuredly it is difficult to place him in all 
three simultaneously, unless the term "value" is so broad in 
his philosophy as to be of little use. However, from the 
passage previously quoted and from the further discussion of 
~------------------------------~I , - 9 
interest in Chapter VI, we see that Mr. Perry is derinitely 
committed to the psychological and subjective interpret~tion 
of value. 
While Mr. Perry insists on "interest" as the central 
fact or value theory, yet he also maintains that its ultimate 
goal is sociality. "Ir the rulfillment of one interest is 
good, the fulfillment ~ two is better; and the fulrillment of 
6 
all interests is best." And again he urges us to "cultivate 
-
that kind of will that is qualified to bring harmony through 
7 its universal adoption". In this social aspect of value, 
Mr. Perry finds many modern sympathizers, among whom may be 
mentioned Ale xander, Sellars, and Prall. 
LaEltly, in, his treatment d Ged as a value, Mr. Perry 
tells us that to "conceive God as a person is both to confuse 
the meaning of personality and to deny God the right to be 
Himself", and again that God is a "norm of legitimate aspira-
8 
tion", but not an attained fact. For him, God is a being far 
exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent on mants moral 
9 
effort. As a justification for this finite god, Mr. Perry 
advances the ~oblem of evil; he prefers a limited deity rather 
10 
than an infinite uod connected with sin and misery. 
2. John S. Mackenzie 
As typical or those British value theorists who empha-
size the subjective character of the problem, let us take 
,----" ----------------------------------l~O~ 
John ~. Mackenzie ot Carditt University. Moreover l some ot 
his statements l it considered separatelYI would otfer l!ttle 
grounds tor criticism. It is from the aggregate and also from 
certain sufficiently definite passages that we must classify 
him. 
In his ultimate Values Mr. Mackenzie asserts that the 
central problem of value theory is to answer the question; 
what is man's chief end-;'l His reply tollows a few chapters 
later, when he informs us: 
"'rhe universe may be created by the desire for the Supreme 
Value l rather than by the propulsion of a supreme Force; 
and l in this senseI Prof. Alexander may be right in think-
ing ot Deity as at the end, r~her than as at the begin-
ning of the cosmic process." 
Later on in this same book he assigns the creation and the 
13 
enjoyment ot beauty the only ultimate value. Thus fao him 
value theory shows man as creating and sustaining the deity 
and the whole universe as well. So much for his idea of God. 
But what does Mr. Mackenzie say of value itselt? He 
14 
tells us that "values are primarily felt"1 that value is "a 
15 
much more fluid and adaptable expression that uood"l that 
value is synonymous with good and truthl but more comprehen-
16 
sive. In a later chapter he takes a definite stand in tavor 
of the subjective interpretation of value. For "it does not 
seem possible to rest in any purely objective end without some 
reference to the way in which we are affected by it ••••• we 
cannot regard anything as intrinsically valuable which we do 
p-'------------------------------------~l~l~ 
17 
not like, or which we cannot bring ourselves to like". And a 
little earlier he remarks that "not only do things have"'Value, 
but we value them; and thus we see that there is both a sub-
18 jective and an objective aspect in the ascription of value". 
If we take a broad view of these last sentences, we may not 
find a great deal to censure; it is only from the general spir-
it of his works that we can be fully sure where Mr. Mackenzie 
stands. Possibly, this situation arises from his very free 
use of the term "value". For instance, he uses it throughout 
his Ultimate Values as a substitute for "good, true, end, 
ideal, motive, subject, object" and like philosophical terms. 
Sucg a broad view, of course, does not help to clarify his 
doctrine. 
B - Relational School 
1. Samuel A. Alexander 
Far fewer than the subjectivists are those philosophers 
who regard value as residing primarily in the relation between 
subject and object. Of these the most conspicuous advocate 
is Prof. S. A. Alexander of Manchester University, who leaves 
no doubt in our minds as to his opinion. 
II In every value n, he as sures us, "there are two sides, the 
subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value 
resides in the relation between the two, and does not exist 
apart from them •••••• The combination of the subject and 
the thing which is valued is a fresh reality which is im-
plied in the attribution of value to either. Value as a 
'~i' __ ------------------------------~12~ 
I quality' belongs to this compound and valuable things, 
truths, moral goo~B' works of beauty, are valuable deriva-
ti vely from it. It .' 
In this same section, he also ascribes derivative value to the 
subject, and then puzzles us by adding lstrangelyenoughl) 
that this "subjective value so far as it is value implies the 
20 
existence of objective which is really the only value ll • Of 
the same tone seems to be an earlier passage, wherein he admits 
that the object is independent of the mind, but the mind depen-
21 dent on it. However, the purport of these two references to 
objectivity seems to be that the object exists, though not in 
a valuable state, previous to the relation of value. For else-
where Mr. Alexander holds that "the value of the object, its 
coherence, is not something which is already in the things 
themselves, but is born along with the act of appreciation ••• 
belongs to the object insofar as the valuing subject appreci-
ates it ••••• as it is possessed by the mind and not outside 
tha t rel ation ... 22 
Of great importance to Mr. Alexander's theory is the 
sociological character of value, which involves a relation to 
the collective or standard mind;3 JrCJr him value is only the 
efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of 
24 
society. It is "the other cr distinctive feature fl that is not 
merely typical, but intrinSically social. 
Mr. Alexander's value theory reaches its culmination 
in his concept of God, which he sets forth at length in his 
Tolundnous Spaoe# 1!m! ~ Deitz· For him valuation at its ~ 
13 
emergent tip-top is deity~ whioh is "the outoome of the world's 
movement and in partioular~ to the extent of their value# of 
25 
the efforts of human beings". Deity is "in the striotest 
sense not a creator~ but a creaturetr~ which must be helped and 
26 
sustained by the labor of man. Deity~ hewever~ must be dis-
tinguished from ~od~ who# insofar as he exists ,and it is 
27 
doubtful whether he exists)# is the nisus towards deity. At 
any event this god of Alexander is the result# not the begin-
ning of man's aotivities; it is finite~ emergent, and the pro-
28 
duot of our valuing. 
2. Roy Wood Sellars 
The ohief exponent of the relational theory of value 
in Amerioa is Dr. Roy Wood Sellars of Miohigan. ~hough he has 
not written much on the subjeot~ he makes his position clear 
by endorsing S. A. Alexander's theory in all its fundamental 
issues~9 However, he aoknowledges that there is something to 
be said for John Laird's objeotive view, and adndts that it is 
essentially correct at the level of praotioal peroeption~ by 
whioh Dr. Sellars seems to mean immediate~ as opposed to reflex 
oognition~O But on the other hand he is lIoonvince4 that reflec-
tion faces us later to distinguish between value meanings and 
the terms of a oognitional type by which we think the nature 
31 
of the object." This distinotion of judgments so as to have a 
, __ .----------------------------------,.14U 
special emotional class for those pertainin.g to value is char-
acteristic of most subjective and relational value theor!sts. 
Following Mr. Alexander in his attitude towards deity# 
Mr. Seilars asserts that there can be no absolute eternal 
standards¥2 He is also very fond of the sociological aspect 
of value# assuring us that it is society which creates the 
real values. 33 
c - Objective Schools 
The objective school of value theorists must be divided 
sharply into those who hold a doctrine more or less akin to the 
Scholastic concept of value and those who# although insisting 
that value resides in the object# nevertheless explain the 
facts of experience in such a way as to render them impossible. 
We shall first consider the most outstanding exponent of this 
latter class. 
1. Wilbur M. Urban 
Perhaps after Mr. Perry# Dr. Urban of Dartmouth has of 
all Americans written the most on this question of value. He 
as been publishing works on the subject for more than thirty 
ears. In his earlier work# he holds for a comparatively sound 
objectivity# a position which he later relinguishes. In Valua-
!!£a# l!! Nature ~ ~ (1909)# he describes value as resid-
ing in the object as "its funded meaning# its desirability# its 
,----------------------------------~l~51 
capacity under eertain conditions of calling our. desire", and 
l1J emphasizes this view by repeating it several times~4t'Cer­
tainly, this opinion is fundamentally sound. Yet even at this 
time he shows the beginnings of his later dirriculties, for 
be cannot agree with Meinong that value presupposes the exist-
ing object or that feeling of value follows the judgment of 
ex1stence~5 However, in this same section, he seems to concede 
the very pOint which he finds so inacceptable, when he admits 
that "there must be the presumption of reality, for without 
it there can be no attitude towards the object~6 
Seven years later (1916), we find him with his doctrine 
of the objectivity of value much more definitely formulated. 
Here he points out that "value is a wholly unique and irreduci-
ble form of objectivity, lying between being and non-being, 
but itself not a for.m of being.~7 He admits that such a for.m 
of objectivity will involve a new relation, the nature of which 
is not clear, but he insists that this does not matter very 
much. He argues in the following apologetic manner: 
"It is, to be sure, extremely difficult to hold fast to 
this conception of value as pure, as a unique for.m of ob-
jectivity, containing no element of being. It is contrary 
to our own ways of thinking. AS we find reality intolera-
ble without raiSing it to the sphere of value, so do we 
find form of being. OUt of this way of thinking arise all 
the confusion which furnished the starting point of our 
study an~8the consideration of which will occupy us in the 
sequel. " 
Unfortunately, it seems that the confusion which he fears so 
much never escapes h1m~9 
~~--------------------------------------l-6--' 
For in a later artiole o£ the same year he assures us 
that value is not a determinant o£ being, nor existenoe 4 'a 
necessary presupposition o£ value. And in his reoent work 
(1926), Yr. Urban is still of the same opinion about value as 
a unique £orm of objeotivity and £ind~ himsel£ £oroed to deny 
,;p... 40 
value the right to be an objeotive quality o£ being. 
However strange and untenable his own dootrine o£ ob-
jectivity may be, we find him strongly~pposed to the subjec-
tive and relational Views, Which he informs us, are a con£u-
41 
sion in terms. Like so many other modera non-Soholastios, 
Mr. Urban lays great store by the anti-intelleotual or affeo-
tive peroeption of value, whioh lies "beyond the ken o£ knowl-
edge and soienoe"fo~ maintains that "worth experienoe in its 
entirety corresponds to a larger world of reality than the 
limited regions of existenoe and truth.,,4~hOUgh this' last 
quotation might lead one to believe that Mr. Urban is here 
drawing a nioe distinotion between being as being and being 
as good, the general trend of his dootrine soaroely warrants 
such a favorable interpretation. Unlike others of the moderns, 
he does not develop a ooncept o£ deity, but rather ignores the 
I issue, preferring only to oonsider value in its more immediate 
aspect of unique form o£ objeotivity whioh is not to be con-
£Used with existence. 
r 17 
John Laird 
Not all, however, of the modern non-Scholastics are 
for the most part at variance with the Aristoleli'an concept 
of good and its modern equivalent value. Especially in Great 
Britain do we find some whose exposition of value theory 
places the emphasis on the priority of the object. Of these 
sound objectivists John Laird stands out preeminent because 
of his recent work in this field. First of all, he goes to 
great pains to point out the weakness of the subjective posi-
tion, especially as it is set forth by Perr, and Prall in 
their motor-affective theory, and also of the pseudo-objective 
position assumed by W. M. Urban~4 Moreover, he attacks the 
modern trend to emphasize the sociality of value to the ex-
clusion of an understanding of its fundamental objective or 
45 
ontological nature. 
But Mr. Laird's work on value theory is not merely 
negative. Indeed, he sets forth his positive doctrine in very 
clear terms, assuring us that the "object of excellence" must 
46 be the kernel of value theory. Those who reject this view, 
he informs us, do so either on the assumption that value is 
purely subjective or on the subsumption of a quasi-objective 
reality "in order to account for the obstinate and undeniable 
47 
appearance of objectivitJ in so many human valuations." His 
own doctrine he calls the timological theory and maintains 
~-~---------------------------------------------------1-8--' 
t>(, , 
that it cannot be denied without falsifying the evidence of 
48 experience. 
3. Dean lAge and Canon o. C. Quick 
We shall consider these two English clergymen mere17 
to see that at Ie ast among their class a sound opinion of ob-
jectivity still seems to linger. Mr. Quick in a brief, but 
eminently satisfactory article shows that subjective states 
cannot be the cause of objective existence. Moreover, he can-
not understand any distinction between logical judgments and 
judgments of value. F~ him all value ceases the moment real-
i t7 is denied or tampered with, sinc,e reality is the onl7 
foundation of all value!9 
Dean Inge is also of mmilar opinion, assuring us that 
any judgment which is not based on exismnce is quite "in the 
air". He accurately observes that existence itself is a value, 
and indeed the most fundamental value, without which all other 
50 
values would be meaningless. 
4. A. P. Brogan 
Returning to the United States, we find at least a few 
value theorists who accept the normal objective position. At 
various times Dr. Brogan of Texas University has advanced a 
OOoctrine which has man7 admirable features, of which the most 
characteristic is its insistence on "betterness rt as the univer-
jP; ___ ------------------------------------------------~1~9~1 
sal value fundamental~l By this he means that in every act of 
valuing there arises a triadic relation of facts wherei~ one 
52 
objective value is preferred ~ better to the other. Whether 
or not this position can be successfully maintained for all 
acts of valuing, it certainly must be admitted that the doc-
trine is strongly objective in the sound sense. 
Moreover, Dr. Brogan~ in anticipation of the difficul-
ties of some adversaries, shows how even conceptual objects -
i. e., those whose existence has not yet been actualized -
53 
have nevertheless a foundation in objective fact. He strongly 
assails the subjective or "definitional" view, which he calls 
a disguise for feeling, and the pseudo-objective or transcen-
dental view of W. M. Urban, which would place value beyond the 
54 
realm of experience. He also attacks the modern tendency to 
distinguish between value judgments and judgments about other 
things, maintaining that such a distinction is purely gratui-
tous. "Moreover", he continues, "value judgments logicalll 
55 
presuppose judgments about existence or non-existence." His 
conclusion as to the future value theory is that the old treat-
ment of the problem must be abandoned - i. e., modern philoso-
phy cannot expect solid results so long as it distinguishes 
between logical and value judgments and sets value over against 
existence. 
John Dewey of Columbia University may be included here 
in connection with Dr. Brogan, chiefly because he wants to go 
20 
on record as endorsing the value theory propounded by that 
.' 56 
eminent professor from Texas. Mr. Dewey himself does not offer 
US anything original on the subject. His own remarks on value. 
scattered throughout various philosophical journals and occa-
sionally introduced into his larger works~ are not profound 
and are sometimes inconsistent with his adhesion to Mr. Bro-
gan's view. Take, for example~ his opposing the realm of 
57 
values to that of reality. This is certainly a strange remark 
to come from a man holding the sound objective view; perhaps 
it should be overlooked in virtue of his endorsement of 
Mr. Brogan's theory. On the other hand, Mr. Dewey repeatedly 
assails the motor-affective attitude of Perry and Prall as an 
"unintelligible stand", since liking or disliking, he assures 
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us, cannot constitute existence. 
Summary 
Many more value theorists could be discussed, especi-
ally among those who hold the subjective view; but this is not 
necessary. By this time we have considered enough represen-
tatives of each school to get a general impression of their 
doctrines. vVhe.ever it was possible, these three points were 
particularly noted: the 4afinition of value (or some equiva-
lent description), the attitude towards the value situation, 
and the resulting opinion as to the nature of God. Leaving 
this non-Scholastic theory for the time, we now pass over to 
~------------------------------------~2~1' 
the Thomistic doctrine on value. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUE 
OUr present task is to consider the Scholastic theory 
of value. This view, we shall see, has always been on the 
objective side of W. M. Urban's "great divide" between sub-
jectivism and objectivism~ Plato, Aristotle, Boeth1us, 
st. Thomas and their whole tradition stand definitely against 
value or the valuing subject as conferring reality, and hold 
instead that reality gives the value, because reality is the 
value. The first philosopher in this tradition was the most 
2 
. taken up with this problem. Aristotle, on the other hand, 
treated the question only fragmentarily and did not differ es-
sentially from his predecessor. Nine centuries later, Boeth1u8 
first advanced a fusion of both these ancient views in the 
medieval doctrine of the transcendentals. As usual, however, 
it is to St. Thomas that we must turn for the finest expression 
of this doctrine wherein truth, being, and good are held to be 
3 
strictly inseparable, except in thought. 
St. Thomas' interest in the question of good and evil -
i. e., of value and disvalue - was not merely one of specula-
tion, but very practical also, since certain heresies of his 
own day demanded definite refutation~ Albigensianism - a sect 
which flourished throughout Southern France and its neighboring 
countries in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries - was 
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a doctrine of non-values, a complete denial and militant re-
jection of all that optimism, that proper valuation of the 
universe which characterizes the Catholic tradition, and which 
was brought to full flower in the Scholastic philosophy of that 
age~ Against this heresy, St. Thomas offers us a satisfactory 
6 
refUtation and an adequate positive doctrine to supplant it. 
This doctrine so well formulated by the Angelic Doctor has 
remained the favorite opinion with modern Scholastics, and is 
most extensively employed by them in their studies of contem-
porary non-Scholastic philosophers. 
So much for the history of the Scholastic view; let us 
now direct our attention to its content. 
A Posteriori Interpretation of Facts of External Reality 
The Scholastic method has always been to start with 
objective existence, and, if possible, to evolve a satisfactory 
explanation of it. This is to say, Scholasticism is a system 
based on the facts of external reality, and committed to A 
posteriori inquiry. It is not a preconceived mold into which 
facts are poured, or a philosophy Which seeks understanding 
at the expense of objective existence. 
What, then, are the irreducible elements of experience, 
those facts which are the most fundamental in any process of 
valuing? In that act wherein the subject acquires an object, 
Whether it be an act of cognition, affection, appetition, or 
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the natural harmonious sequence of all three, these three ir-
.' reducible elements - Subject, object, and the relation between 
them - are alwa7s present. The question then immediatel7 
presents itself: how are these three fundamental facts ordered 
among themselves' Is the object or the subject prior' And of 
what nature is the relation between them' The answer to the 
first question gives us the SCholastic doctrine of objective 
existence; and that to the second question, the Thomistic 
theo~ on the relation of knowledge and valuing to its object. 
Priority of Objective Being 
For St. Thomas objective being is the first fact and 
therefore the principle of all knowledge and appetition. For 
him the object acquired is at least logically prior to the 
subject. He says: "existent being is the proper object of 
the intellect Hl; and again: "that is logically prior which 
first falls under the observation of the intellect. But the 
first thing to fall under the observation of the intellect is 
being, because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it 
actuallyexistsJ! In maintaining the priority of objective 
being, St. Thomas is in perfect accord with the doctrine of 
Aristotle who unmistakabl7 declares that "the first of created 
things is existencel~ In other words, the object must ~, 
before we can know or desire it. 
This objective stand of the Scholastics is fundamental 
~--------------------------------------------------------2~8--~ 
to all sound philosophy and science and is in complete harmony 
with the racts of everyday lire. Those who question th~ob­
jectivity or knowledge must ultimately return to scepticism. 
And although space does not permit us to consider the episte-
mological problem further, it is surficient to say that nobody 
can question the priority or being without contradicting him-
self. 
And yet, there is a certain kind or existence which 
the thinking subject seems to create, which appears to be the 
product or his mind rather than the object or discovery. There 
are some things that do not actually exist except in the mind, 
those things which the subject fabricates ror himself without 
any actual previous contact with external reality. Such con-
ceptual objects have led not a rew or our adversaries to argue 
that at least on this type of being the subject conrers value, 
and endows them with reality. However, thinking or valuing 
does not make being, but presupposes it. Everyday experience 
shows us that our thoughts and desires do not shape reality, 
10 
but, rather, reality shapes us. Now the conceptual being which 
has caused considerable conrusion to some or our adversaries, 
is none the less founded on objective reality prior to the 
thought of it. Unless the subject had pre.iously known other 
objects with Characteristics capable or being assembled into 
a new, compatible, though not yet actually existing, object, 
then the idea would have no value. The mere fact that the 
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conceived being does not yet actually eXist, is not of great 
importance. What matters very much is that unless ther~'were 
other beings previously known by the subject, he could never 
have conceived this thing as possible. 
So far it is clear that being stands first in the order 
of the three irreducible elements of the valuing process: 
object, subject, and the relation between them. What, now, 
is to be said of the second member - namely, the subject? 
Whether there can be value without a subject, we shall see a 
little later; but most assuredly without a subject value could 
11 
not be known. 
Priority of Knowledge Over Desire 
The first characteristic of the valuing subject is the 
fact that its pr~ary action with regard to tme valued object 
or the valuable is not one of affection or seeking, but of 
thinking. St. Thomas unmistakably informs us that "the intel-
lect first apprehends being, then understands it, and thirdly 
12 desires it"; and again: "Knowledge naturally precedes appetite, 
13 for truth is more closely attached to being than the good". 
In other words, nothing can be sought before it is known. 
Thought goes before the deliveration of the will and before 
fulfillment; and the more an action is illumined by the light 
of thought, tm more voluntary and more free it becomes. This 
Thomistic stand on the priority of knowledge over appetite is 
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in direct opposition to the theories of those' very numerous 
value philosophers who hold valuing to be a non-mental p~ocess, 
a product of feeling rather than of intellect. ~he Scholas-
tics cannot understand any merely blind desire of being; for 
of what value is an object that is not known to be of valuef 
When our adversaries make the affections cognize value, they 
are merely transferring the work of the intellect to another 
faculty without justifying the substitution. 
Nature of Relation Between Knowing Subject 
and Its Object 
With the establishment of the priority of objective 
being over the valuing subject, the question at once presents 
itself as to what is the relation between them. In his answer 
St. ~homas again differs from the majority of moderns, when 
he teaches that the real dependence is on the part of the sub-
ject and not of the object. He says; "The real dependence is 
14 
of that which is pointed at the end ft ; and e~sewhere he ampli-
fies this same idea, observing that "the apprehended appetible 
object moves, but is not moved; the appetite moves and !! 
15 
moved". ~uch an order of dependence and independence reveals 
a relation of the mixed variety, real on the part of the sub-
ject, logical on the part of the object. Thus dt. 'rhomas 
clearly indicates that the object acquires nothing intrinsic 
when the subject values it, but at the most gains a conceptual 
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something. 
Our discussion so far shows us the object as ex1~ting 
first in itself and then in the mind of the valuing subject. 
Up to this time we have regarded the object as an indifferenc 
thing. We must now consider it not merely abstractly, but as 
a cause of human action. 
The most obvious fact of human life is its activity. 
From the first moment of his conception until his death, the 
human being is always acting. But the activity of a living 
being is not the same as that of inanimate objects. These 
inorganic units are capable only of transiet action, which 
produces its effect in an exterior subject really distinct 
from the agent. Living beings, besides producing transient 
effects, are capable of the higher form of immanent activity, 
so-called because the change which it produces remains within 
16 
the living agent. Now so fundamental a fact as immanent activ-
ity, which makes itself evident in man's every action, must 
have a solid explanation; and that is what we are seeking in 
value theory - namely, ~ust why do men act? 
When St. Thomas insists on the priority of knowledge 
over appetite, he does not mean to exclude the latter, but only 
to show its natural dependence on the former. Since man acts 
as a unit in pursuing these several stages of action, the en-
tire active process has been briefly designated as one of 
appetition or conatio~7 Why the appetitive rather than the 
32 
cognitive aspect of the process is given the preference in this 
.' key word to the value situation, will become clear as we pro-
ceed with our discussion. Our immediate task is to answer the 
question: why does an object move a man, why does he seek 
things which he does not now possess? In other words, our 
present concern is to discover the reason for human activity. 
Object as the End and the Good 
In the first place, if a man acts at all, he must act 
for an end or objective to ae attaine~8 This is to say, he 
must have an adequate reason for even beginning to exert his 
dormant powers, since of themselves these potential forces 
would have no reason for passing from a state of rest to one 
of activity. Hence, this objective to be attained is a true 
cause, a real motive force which moves the agent to undertake 
any activity. Unless we hold that the end or objective is a 
true motive force which impels the agent to act, we must at-
19 tribute the activity of all beings to chance. Such an opinion, 
however, cannot explain the regularity and order which is man-
ifested in active beings. Chance may account for an occasional 
action, but constant repetition of the same activity in view 
of the same objective to be attained cannot be explained ex-
cept by the inflowing of a true motive force. By tlinflowing" 
is meant the fact that a real cause exerts its influence on 
the effect in virtue of some power that it possesses. What 
this speciric power or a rinal cause is~ will become clear 
~ 
a£ter we have discussed the nature or the object as good. 
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Now this end~ this cause or motive rorce cannot move 
the agent towards action in general~ but only towards a specir-
ic and limited action. Unless the agent is conrronted with 
one determined objective or end~ it would remain virtually 
paralyzed in the race of numerous possible actions. Far in-
stance~ there is no such thing as "just going" without having 
some objective in view. Even so-called aimless walking is a 
movement in one derinite direction run not in all directions 
simultaneously. The mind simply cannot conceive or a vague~ 
purposeless motion towards any number or simultaneous objectives 
It is true that in a complex agent, such as man~ there may be 
as many motions as there are faculties. But at a given moment 
anyone or these raculties can be directed in only one definite 
line towards one definite end or objective. 
Action~ thererare~ is at least never pointless~ but is 
always aimed at some derinite cause or action. This cause we 
have called end or objective to be attained~ or in other words 
that in which the seeker finds his satisfaction, that being 
wherein his desire comes rinally to rest. 
We may now go further and observe more closely the 
nature of this end or objective to be attained. As is already 
quite clear~ its most conspicuous characteristic is its desira-
bilitZ. Since in the Scholastic system desirability consti-
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tutes the essence of goo&pwe may therefore conclude that all 
action is aimed at good l or at that which is in some wa~desir­
able. Thus I the good of the object can be rightly held to be 
a final cause and true motive ferce of human activity!l 
The Relatively and Absolutely Good 
At this point l a distinction must be made between the 
relative and the absolute good. Absolute goodness is that 
goodness which a thing has in itself; it is the degree of per-
fection possessed by that being. Obviously it is not this 
absolute aspect of things which attracts other beings l since 
they desire other things only insofar as they are serviceable 
to themselves. On this matter St. Thomas assures us that a 
being "would not tend towards anything unless there were some 
use in it for itself~2 YetI there is no real difficulty in 
the relation of the absolute and the relative or particular 
good l since what in the subject is good to the subjectl and 
therefore absolute l may be also good to another subjectl and 
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therefore relative or particular. 
The Interesting and the Interested 
In connection with the relative good, we may well con-
sider the question of "interest" and its part in the value 
situation. The popularity which this term enjoys with sub-
jective value theorists makes it highly important for us to 
","' --------------------------------------------------------------------~ 35 
have clear notions about its various oorrect uses. Putting 
aside the economic uses of the term, suoh as "rate of income 
on investments" or the "investments themselves", we find that 
even in philosophy "interest" is employed in several widely 
ranging senses. By some psyohologists "interest" is made 
equivalent to "attention", so that "being interested" means 
24 
"giving one's attention" to something. Another interpretation 
would make "interest" a synonym for "oonoern". Thus we may 
say that some one has an interest in something - i. e., it is 
an object of conoern or a good for him. In this sense inter-
est is like the useful good (bonum utile). But by far the 
most common philosophical use of the term is to signify the 
peculiar attraction of certain objeots in virtue of associated 
25 pleasurable or painful experienoes in the past. Thus we ma7 
say that musio is interesting to us, beoause we find pleasure 
in it. Interest in this sense is equivalent to the pleasurable 
good (bonum delectabile). These last two uses of the term 
"interest" 'S being either the useful or the pleasurable good 
may be seen clea-ly from the following examples. A student 
may have a great interest in mathematics, not beoause he en-
joys it, but beoause it will be highly servioeable in his pro-
fessional oareer. Or again, a child may take great interest 
in a puzzle game, not primarily beoause of its utility to him, 
but beoause it affords him a very pleasant pastime. Generall7, 
voth these interests will be found in the same action in vary-
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ing degrees of intensity. 
The ~portant thing for the value philosopher t~'bear 
in mind is the distinction between the objective interest and 
the subjective state whereby the interest is appreciated. Note 
well that people say that this or that object !s interesting 
( - i. e. 1 useful or agreeable) to them. They reserve this 
word "interesting" for the objectl and do not apply it to their 
desire of that objectl (unless they are reflectihg upon the 
psychological characteristics of the act l and in such an event 
their thoughts about that act would constitute a new interest-
ing object). Without a clearly drawn distinction between the 
interesting object and the interested faculty th~ appreciates 
itl an objective theory of value is impossible. 
Is modern value "the good" of st. Thomas? 
Now that we have discussed the nature of the object as 
an end and as a goodl the question presents itself as to how 
far the modern term "value tl can be identified with the medieval 
concept of "the good". According' to their answer to this query, 
modern Scholastics can be grouped into two Classes: those who 
hold that value and good are synonymous l and those who for some 
reason or other are hesitant in affirming the identitYI though 
they are not very seriously opposed to it. The outstanding 
representatives of the first class are the European Scholastics 
DeRaeymaeker l Donat, and Siwek, while tn the second class may 
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be grouped all the American Scholastics who have written in 
English on the problem, such as Sheen, Bandas, Ward. .,> 
DeRaeymaeker leaves no doubt in our minds as to his 
stand on the question of value, for he assures us that: 
"value is essentially the good, according to the Scholastic 
use of the term; ,it is reducible to being; it is a property 
of being, it ~ being insofar as it is perfective; in one 
word it is the good." 26 
Donat in his turn is equally confident tha;: 
"value is the same as the good, whether this be taken as the 
relative - i. e., convenient good, or as the absolute -
i. e., perfective good •••••• value is not something mere~, 
subjective, but is the objective property of the thing." 
Quite recently, Siwek has taken a similar definite 
stand on the identity of value and the good. "Value", he says, 
"is the formal note of good" and the object to which this for-
mal note of good is referred is "the object of value"?8 He also 
emphasizes the objective nature of the Scholastic theory of 
value by inSisting that "value is founded on being, because 
being alone can serve as a necessary complement to the perfec-
tion of another being, and because being alone can constitute 
a t~ue end".29Moreover, he tells us that beyond all relative 
values, lies the absolute value, pure and simple, infinite and 
necessary.30 
These passages leave no room for doubt as to the atti-
tude of the European Scholastics. They stand definitely for 
the identification of the modern term value with the ancient 
and medieval transcendental of the good. 
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Vihen, on the other hand, we turn to the American au-
.' thors, we discover a certain hesitancy, which one might call 
an almost ex~reme cautiousness. For exwmple, Denis M. Galla-
gher, in his dissertation on Pringle Pattison's "Idea of God" 
observes that value is not quite the s~e as good, but he 
31'· .... 
doesn't develop his argument farther. A more complete opinion 
is that of Dr. Rudolph G. Bandas, who cautions us that "the 
modern temm 'value' is not to be consid~ed as synonymous with 
32 
'goodness'''. But here he is referring to the "bonum in se" 
which is"existentially independent of any value it may have for 
33 
either a person or thing". Little farther on, he adds: "Value 
has at best an affinity with the pleasurable good (bonum delec-
34 
tabile) and the useful good (bonum utile) of the Scholastics". 
And again: "Functional value closely resembles the Thomistic 
concept of a dynwmic bonum: 'Good', says St,. Thomas, 'means 
35 
that towards which appetition tends'". ~ 
Dr. Leo Ward, now of Notre Dame University, sounds the 
same note in his very thorough analysis of the value theory. 
He ably summarizes the entire discussion in the following para-
graph: 
"Our own present conclusion is that wherever there is action, 
there certainly is value ••••• But unmistakably, there i~ 
static value in the mere existent from the beginning, be-
cause the existent is the possible a~ of action •••• Func-
tional value adds the element of being desired •••• Such a 
view of course puts value very nearly into the category of 
'good' or bonum. For value, we say, is resident within 
the existent always, and is functionally there when this is 
object or is sought. And 'good', says St. Thomas, 'is 
~------------------------------------------------~ ~ 
anything' - is the thing itself - 'insota~ as it can be 
striven for and is the end of conative action' •••• This 
is to make of value a dynamic kind ot good. But it~s 
also static an~ean be considered from a more detached 
point of view. 
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In these lines is the attitude of the American Thomists 
accurately epitomized. Dr. Fulton Sheen more briefly sets 
forth the same ideas in his "Religion Without God", which, sinCE 
it was in point of time prior to the other English criticisms, 
and since these other authors did their work at the Catholic 
University under Dr. Sheen, may well have been their source 
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of inspiration. 
Without doubt, there is a difference of attitude in 
the two schools of Scholastic thought, those of the Continent 
being very certain and explicit, and those of America being 
hesitant and indecisive. Possibly, the American Scholastics 
hope that by restricting the use of the term value to the func-
tional good, and even then proceeding with caution, they may 
be able to avoid the verbal contusion in which this value study 
abounds. Possibly, also, they may hope to conciliate the non-
Scholastic philosophers by not appearing to be too dogmatic. 
Whatever may be the intentions of the American Scholastics, 
I think that the method of the European Scholastics is the 
safer one, since it is expressed in such unmistakable language 
that it cannot be misinterpreted in favor of a relational or a 
subjective value theory. In reading some passages from the 
American authors without careful attention to the context, one 
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might get. the latter misleading impression. Our conclusion, 
therefore, is that value and good, especially the relati~e or 
particular good, are to be taken as synonymous. 
Value as the Capacity of An Existent 
to Be the End of Action 
One might next inquire whether a more complete account 
is possible. Though the inquiry is legitimate, the answer is 
not easily forthcoming, since the most obvious things are often 
the hardest to define, and in some cases can only be described. 
Like being itself, value is so familiar to us that any descrip-
tion of it must appear more involved than the thing described. 
Since value is the good, then we can describe it with Aristotle 
as "that which all desire" and with St. Thomas as "that which 
is serviceable either to itself or to another". Of the modern 
descriptions, that by Dr. Ward is the clearest and most fre-
quently accepted. He says: 
"Value is the capacity of an existent to be the end of ac-
tion. It is the character or quality of an existent on 
:~o~tt~~ :~~c~fC~~~~!~;3~r quality the existent is or 
This description of value is a very good one, since it briefly 
indicates the objectivity of value and at the same time em-
phasizes its dynamic nature. On this point the Scholastic posi 
tion differs entirely from that of the moderns, who hold that 
value consists in the subject's attitude and hence the real 
dependence is in the object. 
~------------------------------------------------------4-1--~ 
The fact that the term value might, without violence 
to reality, be applied to the subject also was not unknofn to 
that greatest of value theorists - St. Thomas, for he clearly 
explains the proper view as follows: 
"Good exists in a thing so far as that thing is directed to 
the appetitie, and hence the idea of goodness passes on 
from the desirable thing to the desire itself~9so that a 
desire is called good if its object is good." 
In other words, good is applied primarily to the object and 
derivatively to the subject's attitude. Now since value is 
that character ~ quality which makes an object desirable as 
the end of action, we may with justice apply the term value to 
the attitude or desire also, provided we keep in mind how value 
1s in the object first and in a proper sense, whereas it is in 
the valuing subject only derivatively, and in an aaalagous 
sense. 
An excellent suggestion towards solving this problem 
of the identity of value and goodness is Dr. Ward's admirable 
advice, that the first important thing is not a theoretical 
definition of good or of value, but the correct interpretation 
of reality. The duty of the value philosopher is to discover 
the data of the value situation and to order it properly. So 
long as we keep the objective facts in their proper perspec-
tive, then to what particular datum we apply the term value is 
of minor importance. Here again, the sanity of the Scholastic 
system in accepting reality as it is and then only attempting 
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an explanation of it, triumphs over other procedures. Even 
some of their awn ranks have realized this superiority ar the 
objective view and have cautioned us not to start with the un-
analyzed conception of value and measure reality by it. For 
40 this is to assign value blindly a function it cannot perform. 
We are now in a position to affix definite meanings to 
the ordinary terms used in value philosophy. First of all, 
"value" may be taken as equivalent to the "the good", "the end 
of action", "the objective to be attained". ThUS, everything 
insofar as it is good, can be said to possess value. "Valua-
ble" should be reserved for the object before any particular 
agent evaluates it. The same object will be deemed as "valued" 
after a partiQular agent seeks it. nValuing" will serve as a 
brief descriptive title for the entire active process of cona-
tion - !. e., of striving for a value or valuable object. Note 
well that before a particular agent can evaluate an object, 
that object must have value. It must possess what Donat calls 
"that internal characteristic and excellence of the object 
which is, as it were, an aptitude and dignity on account of 
which an agent will approve of the object and desire to possess 
it":l For this reason, the transition from valuable to valued 
cannot be regarded as a conferring of value, but merely an 
appreciation of something that already exists. 
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Objectivity of Relative Value 
In the preceding pages, we have discussed the good as 
relative or ~rticular. Now it is very important not to con-
fuse the relative good - i. e., the relative value - of the 
Scholastic doctrine with value as being constituted only in 
the relation which results when a subject values something. 
For the Scholastic system, value when taken in the strict sense 
and not merely analogously is always objective. The objectivi-
ty of relative or particular value can be seen from a simple 
example - say, a philosophy manual. To a student of philoso-
phy such a manual would have great value as a source of informa-
tion, but to a student for the time interested only in mathe-
matics it would be worth merely its price of sale. In a sense 
it is true that at a given moment the philosophy manual has 
varying 6egrees of value relative to the students of philosophy 
and of mathematics. But this is no argument for holding that 
the student of philosophy confers the value on the manual, or 
that the manual does not have value before the philosophy stu-
dent became interested in it. This fact becomes evident when 
we reflect that no other book would satisfy the particular need 
of the stUdent of philosophy. The philosophy manual is a parti-
cular good beeause it fills a particular need. If the philoso-
phy student conferred the value, he could do it on the first 
available book, no matter what be its contents. We should also 
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note that the philosophy manual has real value for the stUdent 
of mathematics, if he should ever become interested in ptiloso-
phy. Relative or particular value, therefore, is not value 
in the relation, but true objective value as related or com-
municable to the particular needs of a particular subject. 
Evil as Disvalue 
In the opening paragraph of this chapter St. Thomas 
is mentioned as being interested in the problem of good and 
evil - i. e., of value and disvalue, and of being concerned 
with the refutation of a philosophy that distorted the true 
values of life. Apart from its historical significance, the 
question of evil or disvalue must be given attention in any 
balanced treatment of value theory. According to the Scholas-
tic explanation, evil is nothing positive, but consists in the 
privation of gooat2 It is not the mere absence of any good, 
but is the absence of a good that ought to be present.43 ThUS, 
not to have blond hair is not an eVil, but not to have any hair 
at all is indeed an evil. Since evil is not something positive, 
there is no such thing as a supreme evil or disvalue which 
exists in opposition to the Supreme Value - Go~4 The summa-
tion of non-existents cannot make an existent.45 
It is important to note that evil or disvalue results 
only accidentally from the activity of the agent, since every 
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agent acts for the sake of obtaining good. Whenever an agent 
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seeks what is evil or a disvalue, he does ao because he regards 
that evil as a good for himself here and now. While sueh an 
object is in reality only an apparent good or value, neverthe-
less it could not be sought except insofar as it is desirable 
as the satisfaction of a need within the ~gent,7 
Agent as Value 
The last point to be considered in the Scholastic dis-
cussion of value is one which at first sight may seem to be a 
serious concession to the subjective value theorists. When 
the Scholastic valuists maintain that in the very same act of 
valuing an external object, the agent may be said to seek and 
value himself, they certainly seem to be conceding that the 
agent actually confers value on himselt18 In order to answer 
this objection, we must bear in mind two facts, the first of 
. which is the distinction between immediate and ultimate value~9 
In the Scholastic doctrine the agent is not the 1mmediatevalue, 
but only the ultimate value. The immediate value, on the other 
hand, 1s the object which satisfies the immediate need of the 
agent. By drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the im-
mediate and ultimate ends of the valuing process, the Scholas-
tic theory can avoid much of the confusion that exists at pres-
ent in the non-Scholastic treatment of the problem. 
The second and more important fact to be kept in mind 
is the precise meaning of the phrase "the agent values himself". 
,. 
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In the first plaoe, these words cannot signify that the agent 
.' confers value on himself, because he either has the value from 
the outset of the process, or he hasn't it from the outset. 
To say that he confers it on himself when he already has it, 
is to say that he is wasting time. To say that he confers it 
on himself when he doesn't possess it, is to say that he makes 
something out of nothing. Preoisely, then, what does this ex-
pression "agent values himself" mean? Regarded negatively, it 
states the simple faot that no agent ever aims to defeat his 
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own interests. Regarded positively, it a£firms the fact that 
whenever an agent aots, he always acts for his own well-being -
i. e., he acts in order to preserve himself and his kind, and 
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also to aoquire new perfections. These new perfections are ac-
cidental modifications which help to fill up the void or need 
that exists in every finite being. The more an as-ent has of 
these perfections, the more valuable he becomes to h~self and 
to others also. It is hardly necessary to remark that continued 
existence is a great value to an agent. 
Thus far, we have insisted on the fact that in valuing 
himself the agent regards himself only as the ultimate value 
and, in order to fill up the void that is natural to every 
finite being, must seek immediate values outside his own limited 
store. Yet, if we reflect on the nature of immanent activity, 
with which all living beings are endowed, we seem to find in-
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stances of actions that run contrary to our theory. For im-
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manent activity is defined as the capacity of a living "being 
." to perfor.m actions whose entire process remains within the 
agent. Here, then, we seem to have a case where the agent 
obtains nothing from the outside. The answer is that in many 
actions the living agent does not obtain anything from the out-
side at that particular moment, but merely works over and per-
fects what it received on some previous occasion. Of itself, 
immanent activity is merely the use of a capacity which God 
(and the parents, indirectly) contributed to the agent at the 
moment of conception. For a time an infant might go on work-
ing over the original values conferred upon it at birth; but 
unless it strove to replenish this original gift with new 
values from outside, it would not continue to exist very long. 
The infant, therefore, begins to employ its power of assimila-
ting food values and sense impressions in order to supplant its 
limited endowments. Once this has been done, these values may 
be worked over according to the immanent power proper to them -
vegetative activity for the food values, and sensation and 
intellection for the impressions on the senses~3 But mnless the 
values that result from later immanent activity had somehow 
origina ted in the exterior w'orld, there never would be any such 
activity at all. And so, even the valuing which an agent does 
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of its own well-being is ultimately based on objective reality. 
From this fact that man cannot act without seeking his 
own well-being, absolute altruism is psychologically impossible. 
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There is no such thing as seeking the good of society to the 
complete exclusion of one's own interest. Even in the a~t of 
seeking the Supreme Value, the agent is working for his own 
perfection. For the highest external value towards which man 
can and ought to tend is the glory of God. Yet the acquisition 
of this glory to God is nothing else than man's beatitude, that 
stable possession of the highest and most perfect good, that 
only goal in which man's desires can come finally to rest. 
We see now that in every act of conation, several 
values or levels of value are involved. If we are to establish 
a sound value theory, we must keep the distinction between them 
well in mind. First comes the immediate value in the external 
object - as for exwnple, the warmth of a coat on a cold day. 
To a man living on the Equator this value may be only a latent 
one; but it is truly present, as can be seen, if he were to 
come far north in winter time. Next comes the ultimate value -
the well-being of the agent himself. Thirdly, if the agentfs 
life is well-ordered, this act of valuing his own well-being 
will coincide with the morally imperative act of seeking the 
Supreme Value-God, Who in turn is the complete satisfaction of 
all men's seeking. Only the Scholastic system can fit together 
all these immediate and ultimate, external and internal values 
so as to explain the facts of the value situation. 
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Thomistic Scale of' Values 
.' 
Though the purpose of' this thesis is merely to treat 
the f'undamental concept of' value and not the various levels 
in the ladder of' comparative values, nevertheless a brief' in-
dication of' the order of' values as proposed by st. Thomas will 
not be out of' place here. On several occasions the Angelic 
Doctor suggests a scale of' values, when he mentions three de-
grees of' goods: that of' the soul, that of' the body, and that 
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of' exterior things. In the Summa Contra Gentiles~ he becomes 
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somewhat more def'inite: 
"The order of' good: 
"Now the sovereign good is man's happiness, which is the 
ultimate end f'or him, and the nearer a thing approaches 
this end, the higher must it be placed as a good f'or man. 
liThe nearest thing to this is virtue (as Aristotle says in 
the Ethics)~ and everything else that is of' use to man in 
well-doing, whereby he attains happiness. 
"Af'ter this comes the right disposition of' reason, and of' 
the powers subject to it. . 
"And af'ter this the well-being of' the body, which is requi-
site f'or f'acility of' action. 
"Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ 
as helps to virtue" - as economic wealth~ etc. 
St. Thomas is here dealing with the order of' values in their 
relation to the intensity of' the corresponding disvalue or 
evil. Some men invert this order, thinking that f'inancial or 
corporeal evils are greater. In truth~ however, the greatest 
evil is the loss of' the happiness experienced by union with 
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the Supreme Value, God. 
The most interesting, as well as the most impor~t, 
value in this life is that of moral value, which is commonly 
referred to as virtue~7 More particularly, moral value consists 
in the conformity of one's free acts with the objective order 
of creatures among themselves and in relation to their Creator. 
Moral disvalue, on the other hand, consists in the failure of 
a free act to be conformed with the objective order. Even when 
a man's conscience is invincibly erroneous, his act is none the 
less objectively valid, according to the most universal objec-
tive norm of always doing the right thing as one sincerely 
understands it. To attempt to analyze this question of moral 
value in its relation to modern philosophy would constitute a 
separate treatise. For the purposes of the present thesis, it 
is sufficient to note that moral values, like all other values, 
do not arise from the power of the agent to confer value on 
r'eali ty, but from the inherent good which is in all being in-
dependently of any particular agent. In other words, man does 
not make the morSli order, but finds it already formed on the 
objective relations of creatures among themselves and to their 
Creator. 
Summary 
It is now time to recapitulate. The principal features 
of the Scholastic doctrine a~e as follows: first, value theory 
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is not merely a modern development of Scholasticism~ but was a 
.' problem thoroughly expounded by St. Thomas in the Middle Ages. 
There are three irreducible elements in the valuing process -
namely~ object~ subject, and the relation between them. In the 
scholastic system, the object is prior to the subject and the 
relation between them shows real dependence only in the sub-
ject. While this system insists on the priority of cognition 
over desire, yet it does not thereby intend to exclude the lat-
ter, but only to show its dependence on the former. Indeed~ 
the whole man is a valuing agent that is constantly seeking his 
own well-being. Though the American and European Scholastics 
are not in perfect agreement as to the indentity of value and 
the good~ it is safe to conclude that value and good are iden-
tical. Moreover, to hold that the agent values himsalf is not 
to admit that he confers value on himself. Lastly, from the 
brief outline of the Thomistic scale of values, we see a possi-
ble way of making further investigations in the field of com-
parative values. Thus fortified with an objective concept of 
value and of the process whereby it becomes useful, interesting, 
or valuable to man, we may safely proceed to examine the worth 
of the opinions of the non-Scholastic exponents of value theory. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CONTEMPORARY NON-SCHOLASTIC ~ 
VALUE THEORY 
56 
The form of the syllogism offers a good method for draw-
ing up criticism of a position. Applying this form along broad 
lines to the non-Scholastic theories of value~ we have for prem-
ises the two chief historical origins of non-Scholastic doctrine 
- namely~ the "scientific" approach and the Kantian theory of 
knowledge. In the present chapter we shall discuss the role of 
experimental science in the development of value theory. We 
shall see that value theory borrows from science its current 
interpretations of human life and the universe in general, as 
well as a definite method of procedure. In Chapter V we shall 
treat the second and more important source of non-Scholastic 
value philosophy - the Kanitan theory of knowledge. This fifth 
chapter will show how value theory inherits from Kantian doc-
trine its denial of the objectivity of truth, its disregard for 
substance, and its anti-intellectual temper. After the premises 
comes the conclusion. Accordingly, Chapter VI will consider the 
conclusions at which non-Scholastic value theory has now arrived, 
and.will indicate their inadequacy. Chapter VII comes as a sort 
of corollary after the main syllogism. Of course, if the prem-
ises are inadmissable, and the conelusion consequently untena-
ble, naturally the corollaries of non-Scholastic value theory 
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cannot be philosophically sound. And this we will ~ind to be 
the case, when in Chapter VII we apply the tenets o~ the ~on­
Scholastic doctrine to the ultimate science o~ God. 
Value Theory as Tentative Working Hypothesis 
In the ~irst place, science has given a definite method 
1 to value theory, that o~ the tentative workins hypothesis. By 
"tentative working hypothesis" is understood the use of a form-
ula because of its utility, whether it be true or not. Dr. Ful-
ton Sheen of~ers us this clear description of the method: 
"The formulae o~ science are not true, they are merely use-
ful and convenient. They serve for a time, and sooner or 
later are supplanted by new and other ~ormulae. They ar~ 
relative to the advance and the convenience of science." 
Thus, if the electron theory proves satisfactory for experimen-
tation, why should we be concerned to establish its absolute 
certainty? When the electron theory or any other hypotheSis 
fails to explain the phenomena of experiment, only then need it 
be modified or dropped entirely. 
Naturally, value theo.rists who have not been able to 
work out a satis~actory system of philosophy, would turn with 
enthusiasm towards this idea of a tentative working hypothesis. 
For this reason many non-Scholastic philosophers do not even 
mention the fundamental problem of value at all, but concern 
themselves only with immediate and secondary values. These 
philosophers ignore the problem of an objective foundation for 
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their scale of values and are content with a discussion of its 
present usefulness, whether it be true or not. Yet, thi~ prag-
matic approach to the question of value does not arise entirely 
from the influence of contemporary science. Certainly, however, 
a doctrine which enjoys great popularity in the field of sci-
ence, must have influence in the philosophical work of men, 
such as Alexander, Perry, and Whitehead, who are also deeply 
interested in science. 
The Scientific Interpretation of Value 
In the second place, these scientifically-minded val-
uists not only apply their outlook of the working hypothesis 
to the philosophy of value, but also tend to interpret their 
entire philosophy in the light of present-day "scientific" con-
elusions. Value theory today is often but an echo of current 
"scientific" opinion, as for instance, of evolution or space-
time. 
Thus, among valuists we find R. B. Perry assuring us 
that the theory of value is but a part of the greater scien-
tific movement that has explained the physical world and is now 
3 
successfully annexing the whole of human life. Moreover, his 
own particular interest in biology has led him to apply the 
4 
principle of emergent evolution to the theory of value. S. A. 
Alexander, in his Space, Time and Deity, has attempted to draw 
up a complete explanation of the entire universe in terms of a 
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space-time continum that is also constantly evolving. Accord-
.' ing to this theory~ all nature is one continuous process o£ 
space and timeP These two are the elements that generate all 
things~ time being, as it were, the £orm, and space~ the mat-
terP In this evolutionary process, wherein the quality o£ mat-
ter emerges into life and life into mind, mind itsel£ will ul-
timately emerge into deity, which is "out in front". Value 
theory itself is but a part of this space-time system and arises 
from the amalgamation of mind with objects7 Following Profes-
. sor Alexander not only in his value philosophy, but also in the 
scientific approach to it~ R. W. Sellars insists that we must 
turn to evolution for an anawer to the problems of ontology and 
should regard the living thing as a spatio-temporal system~ 
This modern tendency to apply the procedure and con-
clusions of experimental science to philosophy may be called 
"the fallacy o£ the uniform method of science" ~ OUr present 
concern with it is to discover in what ways it is an unsound 
basis for the philosophy of aalue. 
Rejection of the Hierarchy of Sciences 
The first error of the uniform method of science is its 
assumption that all aCiences, experimental and speculative~ are 
of equal dignity, and its consequence failure to realize that 
there exists a hierarchy of sCiences, according to their degree 
of abstraction from sensible matter. Of course~ while one can 
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hardly expect scientists Dho do not admit the existence or any-
.' thing but evolving matter, space-time, er the like to recognize 
the nature or this hierarchy or sCiences, nevertheless their 
oversight does not alter the racts or experience. As usual, we 
must turn to St. Thomas for an explanation of how science pro-
gresses from the physical to the mathematical and finally to 
10 the metaphysical order. 
Man in his search for the truth of the inner nature of 
reality first abstracts from the individual characteristics of 
things and eonsiders them according to their common sensible 
qualities. This process gives him the science of physics, 
which embraces not merely the limited field which is now known 
by that name, but the whole of the physical sciences. Next 
abstracting from qualities, he considers matter under the as-
pect of quantity only, and thus constructs the science of math-
ematics. Lastly he omits quantity itselr in order to consider 
only being, and thereby evolves the science of metaphysics. In 
each process the matter is the same (e.ther the material world 
for physics and mathematics, or the material and spiritual 
worlds together for metaphysics), but the ferm in each case is 
different. In physics it is quality, in mathematics it is quan-
tity, and in metaphysics, being itself. 
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Fallacy of the Uniform ~ethod of Science 
From the failure to recognize a hierarchy gmong the 
sciences springs the second error of the uniform method -
namely, its application of the principles of a lower science 
11 to a higher one. This process we see constantly applied when-
eVAr the purely physical theory of space-time or the purely 
biological theory of evolution is employed to explain the proe-
lam of value. Whereas the laws and conclusions of these theo-
ries belong entirely to the physical or mathematical orders, 
inasmuch as they deal with quality or quantity, value philoso-
phy is or should be of the metaphysical order, since it per-
tains to the nature of being as being. Metaphysics, however, 
cannot depend upon physics for its principles, anymore than the 
part can be the explanation of the whole. The more reasonable 
expectation seems to be that the lower sciences should depend 
on metaphysics for their first principles, since the principles 
of metaphysics are the principles of being itself, and the mat-
ter of the lower sciences is certainly being" if it is anything 
at all~2Justly, indeed, has St. Thomas named metaphysics the 
first philosophy, because from it all othBr sciences derive 
their ultimate principles. 
Tme insecure position of the uniform method of science 
is further seen from the impossibility of physical science to 
escape metaphysical implication. The very denial of the use-
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rulness or metaphysics is in itselr a metaphysical principle, 
which may be summed up in the rormula that tentative exp~riment 
is the only approach to truth~3 For the modern scientist who 
favors the uniform method, the inescapable subsumption is that 
all reality must be interpreted pragmatically and in terms or 
material being. In order to avoid conceding that physics and 
mathematics either smuggle in metaphysical principles or assume 
principles or their own without proor, some value theorists as 
well as scientists have suggested that by a circular way pro-
pOSitions could be made to depend upon one another and thus 
prove themselves reciprocally. However, this apparent method 
or escape is only a vicious Circle, wherein the propositions 
are made simultaneously to serve contradictory and, therefore, 
philosophically useless roles - namely, those of premise and 
14 
of conclusion. 
In summing up our discussion or the inrluence or con-
temporary science o~ value theory, we see from the works of 
Perry, Alexander, and Sellars, that it has been very great. 
However, this conridence in experimental science has not been 
well founded, since the pragmatic hypotheses and the empirical 
conclusions of biology, physiCS, mathematics, and the other 
natural sciences cannot licitly be applied to the higher meta-
physical science or value. What Perry, Alexander and Sellars 
have failed to realize is that a new natural science (as, ror 
example, a new physics or a new biology) is nothing more than 
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a new natural science and not a new philosophy of nature. Ac-
cording to their way of reasoning, value theory must chsfige 
with each advance of natural science. For St. Thomas, however~ 
while the physical sciences may change~ the metaphysical basis 
for them remains ever the smme, since this basis arises from 
the very nature of being itseli~ Experimental science is in-
deed an inductive process, while the general philosophy of 
value must be chiefly deductive. To regard both as belonging 
to the same order will only result in confusion and ultimately 
in the rejection of metaphysics. And thus crumbles one of the 
two historical foundations of contemporary non-Scholastic value 
theory. 
r 
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a) pp. 15-18, 128-132, 154-160, 671-675 
b) Chap. 17, 20, 21, 22 
Notice especially: 
a) p. 470 "The Paagmatism of the philosophising scien-
tist •••••• is, in fact, but a development of the 
doctrine that the definitions and laws which be-
long to Physical Theory are only symbolic formulae, 
figured hypotheses, postulates which are useful, 
but not true. And this doctrine can only be called 
'pragmatic' retrospectively for it existed before 
Pragmatism proper was invented." 
b) p. 471 "To many scientists, anxious to solve the 
mystery presented by a daily-increasing multitude 
of conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable pypo-
theses, only two alternatives seemed to offer them-
selves, either Scepticism or a kind of provisional 
pragmatism. Believing themselves confronted with 
a choice such as this, many have adopted the latter 
alternative - i. e., rather than give up truth al-
together, they prefer to regard it in Physical Sci-
ence as a "value". 
c) p. 159 "The objection to the Experimental Theory is 
not that postulation and experiment is not a fact, 
but that it is not by any means the only way to 
knowledge. ft 
2. F. J. Sheen, ~ ~ Intelligence, p. 71 In connection 
with this matter, the whole of pages 71-73 should be 
read carefully. Notice in particular: 
a) p. 71 IIModern philosophy is a lyric poet of sci-
ence. By the principle of lyriCism is meant that, 
immediately upon the discovery of any important 
theory in one SCience, modern philosophy applies 
it to its own field whether it is applicable or 
not." 
b} p. 73 "In a general and broad way the lyricism may 
be represented as follows: 
I - Empirical Sc~ence 
Formulae are convenient; they are not true-
but useful. 
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II - Philosophical Lyricism 
A. Philosophical principles, God, eter-
nal veri ties are useful. Their·'truth 
is to be determined by their useful-
ness. Pragmatism 
B. Pure thoughtEI in philosophy are pure 
formulae - in science are fictions. 
Man is the measure of truth. 
Humanism 
C. The value of the idea, as the value of 
the scientific hypothesis or formula, 
is determined by its instrumental or 
functional efficacy. Instrumentalism" 
3. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, pp. 11-13 
4. ~., pp. 152-157 
5. S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, II, p. 67 
6. ill£., p. 47 
7. Ibid., Chap. IX 
8. R. W. Sellars, frinciples ~ Problems 2! Philosophy, 
pp. 214-290 
9, F. J. Sheen, Religion Without ~, p. 224 
10. St. Thomas, l2! Trinitate Boeth1i, q. 5 
11. ~., q. 5, a. 3 
12. St. Thomas, In Metaphysicam, lib. 3, lect. 5 
13. F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of SCience, p. 52 
14. ~., p. 57 
15. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q.86, a. 3, corp. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE KANTIAN HERITAGE OF CONTEMPORARY NON-SCHOLASTI~' 
VALUE THEOBY 
The sedond and more important histOTical foundation of 
current value philosophy is the Kantian theory of knowledge. 
To Kant value philosophy owes its original impetus as well as 
its most fundamental premises~ Though this quiet, unassuming 
German scholar set out to reestablish the validity of metaphy-
sics, yet he proceeded in such a way as to make the attainment 
of this goal impossible. Therefore, when the modern value the-
orists accept the conclusions of Kantian philosophy, they are 
building their ~n doctrines upon the most treacherous of meta-
physical sands. 
Horrified at the extremes to which Bume's scepticism 
had reduced philosophical thought, Kant awoke from his dogmatic 
slumbers, firmly resolved to restore the validity of objective 
2 
concepts. But at once he was confronted with an age-old prob-
lem. On the one hand there was the sensory evidence of parti-
cular phenomena, and on the other hand there was the equally 
important intellectual evidence of universal concepts. Since 
the senses do not perceive this universal element, how is it to 
be explained? Centuries earlier, the Scholastics had worked 
out a satisfactory salution of the problem, one which Kant, 
however, did not consider. Instead, he assumed without proof 
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that the fundamental principles o£mathematics are a Eriori and 
incontrovertible~ By applying these mathematical princi~les to 
the universal concepts which he desired to save, Kant developed 
a system o£ synthetic a Eriori judgments. Since the termB of 
these judgments are not built upon corresponding facts in ex-
ternal reality, they are purely subjective forms, into which 
sensory phenomena are to be poured as into a mold. Thus, real-
ity does not shape thought, as St. Thomas teaches; on the con-
trary, external facts and thought remain mutually separated so 
4 
that the f~mer are of no use in developing the latter. 
Subj~ct Creates Value 
That this interpretation o£ existence has had great in-
fluence on current value theory, we need only to recall W. M. 
Urban' "unique form of objectivity", which is hardly anything 
else than a subject mold of thought. Many others, too, have 
carried this Kantian principle so far as to maintain that value 
(i. e., the perceptive process o£ the subject) even creates 
reali ty i tsel£.5 
Of course, i£ the universal elements in thought are 
purely subjective, then one can never know whether they have 
any objects corresponding to them in the world of external £acts 
This ignorance is not an outright denial of the objective basis 
for thought, but is indeed a profession o£ speculative agnos-
ticism with regard to it. Now, if we cannot know the nature 
68 
of objective reality, and yet we desire to use certain "facts" 
.' of existence, what else remains except to disregard the prob-
lem of metaphysics altogether and to consider only the prac-
tical value that things may have for us? That Kant himself 
arrived at this conclusion is shown fram the spirit and doc-
trine of his Critique of Practical Reason, wherein certain mor-
801 principles, the objective validity of which he dould not 
theoretically demonstrate, are accepted practically because of 
their indispensable value. Thus, free will, immortality, and 
God are not held as theoretically knowable, but only as prac-
tical postulates of great value. 
Weakness of Kant's Speculative Philosophy 
Before proceeding further into the practical aspect of 
Kantian theory, it may be well to pause here for a moment in 
order to indicate the weaknesses of his theoretical philosophy. 
In the first place, Kant gratuitously assumed that the objec-
tivity of universal concepts is metaphysically indemonstrable. 
st. Thomas, on the other hand, has clearly worked out a system 
of abstraction, whereby the universal element can be obtained 
from particular sensible phenomena~ In this system the claims-
of the universal and the particular are reconciled in such a 
manner as to preserve not only the evidence of the senses, but 
also the dignity of the immaterial intellect. The necessity of 
abstraction arises from the peculiar nature of man, who is part-
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ly matter and partly spirit. Since it is the immaterial ele-
ment which cognizes universal concepts1 matter in order ~o be 
known must be elevated to the level o~ the spirit by means o~ 
abstraction. Moreover, since man obtains all his knowledge 
somehow through the senses~ he must use abstraction in order 
to obtain any cOncept at all o~ purely immaterial beings. 
Kant rightfully recognized the necessity of general 
principles as a foundation ~or physics. But where he went 
astray was in assuming that these principles must be accepted 
a priori ~rom mathematics. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, 
all that man needs to get started in his philosophizing is the 
"habitus primorum principiorum spectabilium", by means of which 
he can a~terwards construct the highest science of metaphysics. 
This habitus is not an innate for.m, but merely the natural dis-
position o~the mind to recognize ~irst principles (as, for in-
stance, the prinCiple of contradiction) as self-evident. st. 
Thomas clearly tells us that while the light o~ this habitus 
is from the intellect, its specific matter is from the senses; 
Moreover, mathematical prinCiples are of little avail ~or the 
ultimate explanation o~ physical phenomena, since they them-
selves are not ultimate. Mathematical principles as such per-
tain to quantity alone, and not to being, and therefore, they 
10 
cannot give us the ultimate reason for things. 
Another dif~iculty under which these synthetlC a priori 
forms labor is their complete lack of contact with reality. 
r 
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Kantian subjectivism, by exaggerating the runction or the im-
manent raculties or knowledge, deprives itselr or anysa";is-
11 
factory standard or criticism. As a result, there is no good 
reason why the phenomena of experience should be poured into 
one form rather than into another. The Kantian category or 
relation, ror example, has no more right to mold substance and 
accident than have the rorms or space and time. When Professor 
Alexander sets out to explain away substance as a space-time 
continuam, he can rind a complete philosophical justirication 
of his theories in the doctrines already advanced by Kant. 
Practical Reason, the Prototype of Value Philosophy 
Returning now to the practical aspect or Kantian meta-
physics, we shall see that it has been unquestionably the most 
outstanding inrluence on value philosophy and really deserves 
to be acclaimed as the rirst systematic subjective theory of 
value. Though Kant did not employ this term for his system, 
he obtained substantially the same conclusions as are reached 
today. Through his speculative philosophy, Kant had eliminated 
the very concepts which he had set out to reestablish. But if 
theoretical science could not save these concepts and yet they 
seemed indispensable to human action, there must be round an-
other way or restort,ng them. Accordingly, Kant had resource 
to a second raculty or the soul - its "practical reason", as 
he called it. 
7l 
Now, this practical reason is not the intellect under 
another name, for then the problem would have been merely a 
quibble over words. Neither could Kant achieve anything for 
his metaphysics by attributing cognoscitive powers to the prac-
tical reason, since this admission would have contradicted all 
the previous conclusions of his theoretic philosophy. Hence 
the perception acquired through the practical reason is not in-
tellectual, but affective or vol1tional. It is a blind, un-
rational seeking after the thing, the objective validity of 
which can never be known, but must be postulated and ~ as 
valuable. Of course, any It judgments It that are formula ted about 
such value postulates can never be regarded as immediately re-
presenting objective being. 
To provide for this point, Kant's successors began to 
evolve a distinction between judgments of existence, which, in-
asmuch as they deal with the inaccessible objectivity of things, 
are purely conjectural and useless, and judgments of value, 
which alone are serviceable to man. Though Herbart, Lotze, 
Brentano and others all contributed to the development of the 
distinction,12yet it is to Ri tschl' s efforts that this idea owes 
its greatest pOPularitf~ The Ritschlians sought to divonce 
theology from speculation by denying the validity of all judg-
ments in the religious sphere, except judgments of value~4 For 
them, these value judgments are "conditioned by personal char-
acter and experience, unlike the theoretical judgments, in which 
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methods of reasoning common to all sound minds are applied to 
the data of perception apprehended by sound sense il!5 Modern 
logicians who have been at pains to reconcile these existential 
and value judgments~ argue that nitschl did not intend to exag-
ger,ate the separation between reality and valuJ;6 Yet even these 
defenders concede that he did not carry out his theory in prac-
tice, and that today there still prevails a definite antithesis 
between the logical and the value judgmen~7 
~o appreciate the great extent that this doctrine of 
the anti-intellectual perception of useful postulates has had 
on the modern theory of value~ one need only to glance through 
the pages of Perry~ Alexander~ Mackenzie, urban and numerous 
otherst.8 tiere one will find value constantly referred to a8 
"liking", "affective stateil, Ufeeling", "worth experience", 
"satisfactorinessn~ etc. .Ion .eerry's works~ for instance~ value 
becomes the "motor-affective attitude~, ever to be interpreted 
in terms of ·jinterest"~9 For Mackenzie, values exist only :~if 
they are felt", and for ~exander the only approach to deity 
20 is through "sentiment". urban devotes several chapters of his 
Valuation, its Nature and Laws to establiShing the emotional 
nature of the experience of value. rie tells us that all worth 
experience is feeliag and all consciBusness of value is at any 
time our emotional consciousness.21 lt'0110wlng J:{itschl~ he accept 
the distinction between existential judgments and those per-
22 _ 
taining to value. Seth ~ringle-~attison even goes so far as to 
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maintain that feelings of value are as effective an instrument 
of reason as is logical investigation.23 Moreover, accord!ng to 
him, judgments of value are as objective in their own sphere 
24 
as is a scientific judgment on matters of fact. And these are 
but a few outstanding examples of the many modern non-Scholas-
tics who have espousedthe cause of the Kantian affective, anti-
intellectual perception of value. It is now time to investi-
gate whether their confidence in Kant has been justified. 
Practical Reasons as Psychologically Useless 
According to the traditional Scholastic doctrine, the 
will is indeed a blind faculty, but not in the sense that it 
has no known object~5 While the will itself is not the cognos-
citive faculty, neverthelessit can receive its object from the 
cognoscitive faculty or intellect, and therefore, is not blind, 
26 in the same sense, as is the Kantian will. For St. Thomas, the 
act of the will follows the act of the intellect, and is not to 
be regarded as being in juxtaposition with it. In other words, 
the reason for seeking always precedes the seeking itself. For 
Kant, however, since there is no objective reason for appetite, 
the appetitive faculty must desire and also somehow generate 
the object of its desire. It must first induce a subjective 
state and then in some way objectivize this state. Now as we 
have already seen in Chapter the third, there can never be any 
action without a definite object as the end or goal of that 
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action. For without a derinite goal, the appetite would tend 
.' indirferently in all directions, ir it could tend at all. 
Merely to make the action or the appetite tend back upon it-
self without any rererence to an object is a useless process; 
ror how can an insurricient thing rind in itselr alone the 
satisraction or its insurriciency? It is quite true, however, 
that the object or the appetite need not always actually exist; 
it can be a conceptual object, an end to be actualized. But 
even this kind or goal is impossible to Kantian metaphysics, 
since conceptual objects have real roundation in external being. 
Thus the Kantian will, lacking any actual or coneeptual term 
or motion other than its own subjective state, is in reality 
psychologically useless and metaphysically impossible. It sim-
ply cannot act because it has no end in view; and a will that 
is not active is no will at all. ~~d hence those modern valu-
ists who round their theories upon this doctrine of practical 
utility, have in reality no reason for philosophizing at all,-
since they can never have any object to value, except their 
own insufricient subjective states. 
A very simple example will serve to demonstrate the un-
tenable position of this practical value theory. Ir a hungry 
man can find no food that is objectively valuable as a satis-
faction or his hunger, then there is no use or desiring at all, 
for certainly the hungry appetite cannot by desiring satisfy 
itself. For a value philosopher to admit that the objective 
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thing - food - is capable of satisfying the appetite of hunger, 
would be to deny in practice what he holds in theory. ~d 
furthermore, there can be no escape by insisting that the val-
uing subject confers value on the object, for if this were 
true, there never would have arisen any appetite at all. If 
the unsatisfied subject can confer satisfaction on an object, 
he can save time and effort by immediately conferring it upon 
himself. 
A third feature of the Kantian theory of knowledge that 
is of great importance to value philosophy is its agnosticism 
with regard to the objective existence of sub§tance. Yet Kant 
himself, aware of the need of a subject in which accidents 
might inhere, admitted a being as such. But inasmuch as this 
being as such would be a noumenon, he logically denied to it 
any objective validity. Of course, a substance that is not 
objectively valid can never be of any use as a substrate for 
accidents, if these should happen to be objectively valid. Ac-
cording to Kant, we understand the relation of substance and 
accident because the mind relates them this way. But one may 
legitimately inquire as to why the mind relates substance with 
accident and not with space or time. If there is no objective 
validity to the relation 06 substance and aCCident, it is cer-
tainly strange that the mind should always relate these two 
forms in preference to other subjective combination. 
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Value as a Quality 
This Kantian attitude towards substance has produced a 
double effect on the theory of value; first, its re.jection of 
the objectivity of substance, and secondly, its consequent 
acceptance of value as a quality. As for the rejection of sub-
stance, we see it in Perry's idea of the soul, wherein he 
naively assures us that "no one would now think of conceiving 
the soul as a simple, indivisible, and incorruptible static en-
~7 tity'. We see it again in Sellar's concept of the soul as a 
flstream of ideas", altogether different from the medieval mind-
28 
soul. Mackenzie, in his turn, informs us that the notion of 
29 
substance is no longer in favor with metaphysicians. And 
Alexander's space-time continuum is nothing else than a strange 
30 
fusion of acts with their subject of inhaesion. 
But if value philosophy drops substance, there is nothin 
left for it, except to turn to the consideration of qualities, 
and the one quality which best fits in vdth the anti-intellec-
tual temper of modern thought is the quality of value. Yet if 
there is no external substance in which this quality of value 
can inhere, value cannot be an objective quality. For in such 
a supposition, the accident of value would be an entity with an 
essential aptitude for a substance that can never exist. For 
this reason, the value theorists who reject the objectivity of 
substance must also sacrifice the objectivity of the quality of 
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value, and conrine themselves to regarding it as a subjective 
state. .' This latter assumption, however, is not a solution or 
the problem or value, since it labors under all the usual dir-
ficulties or a subjective position. 
Swmnary 
It is now time to sum up the leading effects or Kantian 
theory of knowledge on current value theory. First or all~ 
Kant, by destroying the theoretical userulness or metaphysics 
as a means or establishing the objective validity of truth~ 
made the problem a pragmatic one. Then by describing the prac-
tical reason or will as a blind raculty indepedent or previous 
cognition or external reality, he rendered the act or valuing 
psychologically useless. Lastly, by proressing agnosticism 
with regard to the objectivity or substance, he rorced value 
into the category of quality; and since this quality can have 
no external subject or inhaesion, it also becomes a purely sub-
jective rorm. In this fashion Kant completely separated the 
problems of being and o~ good. For him good, ir it were ob-
jective at all, could not be convertible with being, as St. 
Thomas hold~~ As a result, the problem of existence and the 
problem or value must go along different paths, and the philos-
ophy of value cannot be an explanation or objective experience. 
And thus, the value theories which are founded on this Kantian 
rejection of metaphysics (and most or them are founded on it)~ 
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must start out without any philosophical basis and must be 
relegated to the realms of sentiment and emotion. 
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FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER V 
.' 
1. It is important to note that Kant was not, strictly speak-
ing, the first value philosopher, though he was the first 
non-Scholastic to erect the theory of value into a system. 
Clear, though remote, roots are found in Cartesian Imma-
nence and in the Hobbes-Hume Interest Theory of ethical 
values. 
I - For Cartesian Immanence, cf: 
A. Thomas Harper, 1he Metaphysics of the School, 
Vol. II, p. 90. Notice in particular "the 
theory of the French philosopher diverted 
scientific inquiry from its previous quest of 
objective truth •••• Results: Philosophy in 
no long time came to be identified exclusive-
ly with ideology and psychology, till it was 
finally distilled into a transcendental 
logic ". 
B. F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 99-100; 
also Chap. V. Descartes declared in favor of 
ImmaneBce when he separated intellection from 
sense experience. Thereby he exalted flthe 
within" or the immanent in man. This expla-
nation of the intellect as independent of 
sense, is the first step in the long process 
of ever increasing denial of the transcendent 
and consequent assertion of the immanent, 
which eventually developed into the agnosti-
cism and the practical value theory of Kant. 
C. L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 213-
214; 291-293 discuss and criticize immance 
in Kantian philosophy. 
II - For a history and criticism of the pleasure or 
interest theory of ethical values, cf: 
A. Michael Cronin, Science of EthiCS, Vol. I, 
Chap. X. In this theory the distinction be-
tween good and evil is not founded on the 
objective order of the universe to its Crea-
tor and within itself, but is explained sole-
lyon the basis of subjective emotions of 
pleasure or interest. 
B. ~. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 344-345 has a brief 
treatment of this theory. 
2. In order to avoid an excessive number of references the 
writer here acknowledges his indebtedness for the exposi-
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tion of Kantian doctrine to the following sources. 
I - R. G. Bandas, Contemporary Philosophy and Thomistic 
Principles, pp. 234, 268-272 treat the Kanti!h ori-
gin of the sentimental approach to religion. 
II - F. J. Sheen, God and Intelligence, pp. 9-47; 62-141 
consider the non-intellectual approach to reality 
in general. 
F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Science, pp. 5-11, 105-
107, 125-127, 154-155 discuss Kant's debt to mathe-
matics and his influence on science. 
F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 156-195, 
292-297 discuss the three Critiques, Kant's suc-
cessors, and his effect on religion. 
III - L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge is a very read-
able and lengthy treatment of the Kantian theory of 
knowledge its subsequent history, and of Scholastic 
realism. 
3. L. J. Walker, OPe cit., pp. 9-10, 217-222 
4. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84, a~ 6 
5. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 550 
D. M. Edwards, "Religion as a Value Experience fl , Hibbert 
Journal, April 1930, p. 494 
F. C. S. Schiller, "Fact and Value", Proceedings of the 
Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926, p. 300 
6. St. Thomas, OPe cit., la, q. 85, a. 1 & 2 
L. J. Walker, OPe cit., Chap. XIII-XV, in which the devel-
opment of the universal idea from its origin in the 
particular external objects is adequately discussed. 
7. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 66 
8. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84, a. 7 
9. Ibid., la 2ae, q. 10, a. 1 
10. L. J. Walker, pp. cit., p. 244 
11. St. Thomas, De Trinitate Beethii, q. 6, a. 2 
12. J. M. Baldwin, OPe cit., Vol. II, p. 823 
13. Hasting's hncyclopoedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, , 
p. 585 
14. J. M. Baldwin, Ope cit., Vol. II, 475 
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cal Bulletin, VI (1909), p. 335 
M. Picard, Values Dmnediate and Contributory, p. 39 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOME INCONSISTENT 00 NCLUSIONS OF 
NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORY 
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.' 
Our criticism so far has been directed towards demon-
strating bhe insecurity of contemporary non-Scholastic value 
theory because of its heritage. A doctrine that is lacking in 
sound origins is not likely to attain correct conclusions. If 
our investigation is to be complete, we must also consider the 
theory of value from another viewpoint than that of its his-
torical basis. While the history cannot be entirely separated 
from the effects which it produces, nevertheless this chapter 
will emphasize the preseht status of value theory. This status 
may well be regarded as a sort of fallacious conclusion to the 
insufficient historical premises which wehave already criti-
cized. 
Value Theory, A Veritable Babel of 
Philosophical Jargon 
But before we enter upon the discussion of the present 
status of non-Scholastic value theory, let us first consider 
a more important aspect of almost all the non-SCholastic opin-
ions - namely, their promiscuous use of terminology. This ex-
cessively free use of terms has unfortunately resulted in an 
almost hopeless confusion. W. H. Sheldon admits that none of 
the current theories are based on an ungmblguous, non-circular 
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1 definition, and George Samtayana cries out in despair at the 
.' modern Babel of gigurative terms and perverse categories that 
2 
render cogent thinking well-nigh impossible. In these doctrines 
the term value is applied indiscriminately to almost anything, 
whether it be the object, relation, subject, affective state, 
or any other factor that may enter into the value experience. 
Take, for instance, Perry's formula that "X is valuable equals 
interest is taken in X", which may be abbreviated "valuable 
:3 
equals valued". A theory which does not distinguish between 
the capacity for being valued and its subsequent actualization 
is certainly destined for serious misunderstanding. Mackenzie, 
too, can scarcely be expected to avoid grave inconsistencies 
through an "elastic" term that covers almost every concept in 
4 
the field of philosophy. Many mor'e examples of this sort of 
inconsistency and exasperating vagueness could be enumerated, 
perhaps the worst of which are Perry's three conflicting defin-
itions of valuegiven in Chapter V of his General Theory of 
Value.5 However, these typical citations are sufficient for our 
purpose. 
Let us now concentrate our attention on the weakness of 
the subjective position. For without question the subjective 
view oflalue is the most popular among the non-Scholasti~who 
do not favor a doctrine approximating that of Thomism. Further-
more, since both the relational and the pseudo-objective views 
can be reduced to the subjective pOSition, the refutation of 
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that line o£ argument will be tantamount to a defeat of all our 
adversaries. .' 
One feature of value experience which has made a deep 
impression on subjective theorists is the ever present £act of 
a subjective state. Perry, for instance, spends lar~;e sections 
of his General Theory of. Value in demonstrating how constant 
interest is in all valuing. Unban, too, even when he is not 
certain about the "validity of value, nonetheless insists on 
6 the ever present act o£ valuing. Now with these views the 
Scholastic system can have no quarrel. Certainly i£ there is 
a value experience, there is also a subjective state, which is 
nothing more than the subject's part in the relation between 
itsel£ and its object. The point on which Scholastics disagree 
with their adversaries is that the mere presence of a subjec-
tive state is of first importance in constructing a value phil-
osophy. When non-Scholastic theorists argue that, since in 
every value experience a subjective state is present, value it-
self must be subjectiv9, we retort the issue by pointing out 
the equally important ubiquity of the object. Thus, all 
Perry's concern over the constancy of interest ends only in an 
inconducive stalemate th~ leaves the discussion to be settled 
by means of other issues. 
Even more important to the subjective school than this 
emphasis on the presence of a subjective state is its attitude 
that the agent confers the value on the object. All subjecti-
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vists are agreed on this point~ whether they are the moderate 
kind who admit the previous existence of the object or tHe more 
radical sort who insist that valuing .creates reality itself. 
our problem~ therefore~ is to show that this subjective con-
ferrin~ of value on the OBject plainly contradicts the evidence 
of experience. 
why Agent Does Not Confer Value 
~ tne fi~st place~ one may jUBtly inquire how the val-
uing subject knows on what object he ought to confer value. 
According to this theory~ previous to the act of valuing~ the 
object does not possess value and therefore~ all objects should 
attract the subject equally or~ rather~ no object should attract 
him at all •. fhe dog who seeks a bone to chew upon~ should find 
equal satisfaction in a mouse-trap or an automobile wrench. I:et 
somehow no dog ever smuggles away an automobile wrench in order 
to bury it for future reference. Moreover~ if a man taking this 
theory seriously were indifferent abeut the nature of the object 
on which he conferred the value of food, someday he might un-
fortunately confer this value on a huge doee of arsenic. xet 
if the value comes only from the desire of the subject, there 
really should not be any difficulty. 
·J.'he natural conclusion which one can legitimately ex-
pect from the theory that desire confers value on the object is 
the impossibility of failure. ~f on the one hand our psychol-
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ogical states have power to modify external reality, and on the 
~ 
other the condition of the object makes no difference to the 
act of valuing, one need only to desire and immediately his 
wish would be fulfilled. Thus value would become the most per-
fect and most completely satisfying Aladdin's 19mp that could 
ever be imagined. Failure in such a supposition could arise 
only from the inability of the subject to induce the froper 
state of desire in himself. Yet, sad to relate, we can point 
out in a single day many desires which remain unfulfilled, sim-
ply because our subjective state was not equal to the opposi-
tion that external reality placed against it. How many people 
would be poor if riches could be had for the wishing? 
Though this criticism may seem very severe, it is never-
theless a logical one. Neither can the subjective valuist ea-
cape from it by urging that certain objects are not capable of 
receiving value. For what difference does the state of the ob-
ject make when the value comes only from the agent? To concede 
that certain objects are incapable of being valued is to admit 
that in others there .is an objective capacity for that quality. 
This admission would scarcely differ from the Scholastic con-
cept of value as the capacity of an existent to be the end of 
action. ThUS, subjective value theory is either a mere misun-
derstanding due to the too freeuse of terms, or it is an un-
witting confession that the Scholastic philosophy alone axplains 
the data of experience. 
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In the last chapter we already considered the psycho-
.' logical futility of the subject's conferring value on the ob-
ject, when he could save time and trouble by immediately con-
ferring it on himself. Our purpose in mentioning it again at 
this point is to emphasize the argument of the preceding para-
graph, and also to show that this subjective conferring of 
value is a needless multiplication of entities. The strict 
idealist who holds that value creates the world itself is at 
least consistent in rejecting a previous existence of reality. 
But why should he bother to create appearances of objectivity 
at all? 
As the inquiring mind naturally seeks an answer to the 
beginning of things, one may rightfully expect the subjective 
value theorist to have an explanation of how the first value 
originated. According to this theory, it is man who confers 
the value on the object. But where did man get the faculty of 
conferring value? Where, indeed, did man come from at all? 
Are we to believe that man created himself and then generated 
the power of valuing out of his own need for it? Strange to 
relate, this is possibly the answer that Perry gives us, when 
he observes that "the living organism isnot merely an organiza-
tion and an individual, but it somehow acts ao as to bring this 
organization and individuality into existence, or so as to main-
7 
tain and conserve them". More likely, however, Perry does not 
mean this passage to be an answer to the question of the ori-
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gin of life, but only a suggestion as to the manner of its con-
.' tinuance. For elsewhere he admits that, although he has pro-
posed to himself the question "Where does the world get its 
8 
shove and go?" he has not yet discovered a satisfactory answer. 
Mackenzie for his part honestly avows that value theory seems 
to have begun with pure emptiness~ and Alexander frankly con-
cedes that quality is the great mysterylO R. W. Sellars, on the 
other hand, does not understand why Mackenzie should be worried 
about the origin of matter and life. He tells us sincerely 
that he "cannot - with the best desire in the world - see ade-
quate ~rounds for the assumption that physical systems are not 
11 
se1f-sufficient". For him the fourth dimension, or in ether 
words God, is a needless hypothesis. 
A doctrine that professes to deal with ultimates and 
yet cannot account for the value that is in its own proponents 
certainly labors under a serious charge. yet this is indeed 
the sad condition of subjective value theory. ~f man confers 
value, he is the cause of all of it, including any that may be 
in himself. ~s a result, we have the great mystery of value 
originating out of pure emptiness. ~cholastic philosophy, on 
the other hand, has no difficulty with the problem of the ori-
gin of the world. It clearly demonstrates the existence of a 
necessary First vause, Who is the rrimum Movens of all other 
action.121"rom this Supreme Agent value flows into all the ob-
jects of his creation~3 Moreover, God is the Source of all 
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value, not merelY,because He is the 0reator ot' all things, but 
.' also because rrom Him alone comes the good which is in every 
14 being. Whether man existed or not to evaluate the goodness or 
objects, this goodness would still be there, since it is one 
with the existence or things. ~homistic doctrine not only 
places absolute goodness in the object, but also shows how this 
absoluje worth tends to communicate itselr to other things b¥ 
15 
being ot' value to them. 'l'he value ot' an object is not merely 
a bonum sibi, but is moreover a bonum alteri. In this way, 
there is no great gulf between abIolute and relativ~ good, and 
16 
both can be traced back to a self-sufficient First Cause. 
ubstinate Reality, the bugbear of uubjective yhilosophy 
The untenability ot' the doctrine that the subject con-
t'ers value on the object is further seen t'rom the over-whelming 
difficulty that subjective valuists find in attempting to ex-
clude objectivity t'rom their theories. ~o great amd 8p constant 
is the appearance of objective reality in the human mind that 
i\.ant himself admitted it to l:B a transcendental illusion, which 
the intellect cannot hope to exclude, but which it must never-
theless endeavor to reason away:'? 'l'urning back to vhapter the 
uecond, we see how Mackenzie at times virtually admits the ob-
jectivity which he generally seeks to take from value. Alex-
ander also seems to have the same problem, and Perry openly con-
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cedes some sort of value to the object!8 Laird, on the other 
hand, belabors the subjective value theorists for their ~­
willing subsumption of Objective excellence, and neatly points 
out the weakness of a system which somehow cannot avoid leaning 
on the doctrine of its adversaries!9 
by way of example, let us consider two passages from 
f'erry's General 'fheorI of value in order to see how the subjec-' 
tive valuists smuggle the objectivity of value back into their 
theories. On page 30, rerry tells us that he cannot find in 
the object a distinct quale to which he can attach the term 
value, and consequently he concludes that there is no such 
thing. In one sense, ~erry is correct, for value is not a qual-
ity, if by quality is meant an accident. Value inasmuch as it 
is good is identified with the total entity of the object. How-
ever, let us suppose that there is no objective quale which may 
be called value. Later on page 124, we find ~erry conceding 
that value is an "object of interest" or the "special character 
of an object". 'l'hen on the next page, he maintains that in 
order to create a value, one need only to take interest in some-
thing. ~mmediately after thiS, he admits that his argument is 
apparently redundant, since one may say that it proves only that 
objects of value are perceived whenever interest is taken in 
them. V/hereupon he goes to considerable pains to show that the 
accusation against his position isnot well grounded. i,.('he whole 
point of this paragraph is to indicate the way objective value 
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keeps creeping back into subjective philosophy. According to 
.' this theory, there should be no difficulty over objective value, 
and yet somehow it cannot be gotten rid of. 
'l'his attitude has been accurately expressed in a brief 
article by Leonard J. Russell of Birmingham, wherein at once the 
method and the weakness of the subjective position are clearly 
demonstrated. Mr. ttussell tells us that ftvalues must function 
a priori in the building up of experience", even though "we 
have to force them on reality"; and again, that value is the 
clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the 
contrary. 20 Despite all his desire to force prinCiples on reality 
he admits that "reality is the potterts wheel against which man 
mus t hold himself if he is to be truly moulded ~l Probably no 
more definite statement of the subjective cause and its help-
lessness in the face of external phenomena has ever been uttered 
by a value theorist. How much better it would be for Mr. Rus-
sell, if he were to stop fighting facts and the obstinate ap-
pearances of reality, and accepting the inevitable, construct 
an objective theory based on the evidence of experience. 
R. B. Perry, indeed, attempts to rej ec t the obj e.c ti ve 
view as being a pathetic fallacy. He says that objective value 
may n<t be harmful "for prac tical or poetic purposes, but for 
theoretical purposes it is fallacious"~2 His argument runs as 
follows: "to suppose that the force of desire liesin the object 
of desire is precisely as misleadin0 as to suppose that the force 
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of the explosion lies in the ignition, or that the force of the 
2~ ~ 
engine lies in the throttle. ff -r.f anybody ever explained the 
objective position in this way, ~rofessor Perry is certainly 
justified in taking him to task. Assuredly, however, this is 
not the ::>cholastic doctrine. Perry's term IIforce of desire" is 
not altogather a happy selection, since it may refer either to 
the intenSity of the subjective act of desire or to the capaci-
ty of the object to excite that desire. When the Scholastic 
view places the lIforce of desire" in the object, it is referring 
to the object1s capacity to be the end of action. Although the 
object has "ferce" in the strict sense, it has desire only in a 
metaphorical one. ~erryls difficulty, therefore, may be re-
solved into a vague use of terminology, which could hardly have 
arisen in the ~cholastic system. 
~o far in this chapter our concern has been to indicate 
certain general weaknesses in the subjective posi tion. v-~e shall 
now consider some special ~oblems of the three leading valuists 
Perry, Alexander, and urban. 
~nconsistencies of the Interest Theory 
Certainly the most convincing condemnation of a manls 
argument is his own inability to formulate it without contra-
dictions. Sinee we have already belabored ~rofessor Perry for 
his three conflicting definitions of value, we shall pass on to 
a consideration of the most outstanding feature of his theory -
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namely, that of interest. According to }.Jerry, interes"t is a 
.' "State, or attitude, or act, or process, which is characteris-
tic of living things, which is unmistakably present in the 
motor-affective consciousness of man, and which shades away 
thrcugh instinct and reflex to the doubtful borderland of tro-
pism. f,24 Briefly, it is the "motor-affec ti ve life ~ of which 
"value is a function".25'11hough this definition of interest may 
seem to include the phenomena of vegetative and sensttive life, 
~erry later informs us that such is not his intention, since 
only the diverse modes of human behavior can furnish sufficient 
data for the science of valu~6 ~hus interest taken strictly is 
to be interpreted in psychological rather than a biological 
sense. ".1."his psychologioal stand of ::erry is quite remarkable 
In view of his earlier approval of the behavioristic interpre-
tation of life, wherein, however, he admits that he is a be-
haviorist without PSychophobia.27 yerry's reason for rejecting 
the broader biological interpretation of interest is that with 
suoh a view man may feel that life is not worth livin~8 Acoord-
ing to him, while the strictly biological interests a:z:e con-
cerned with the preservation of the organism through its funda-
mental li~ processes, civilized man on the other hand has higher 
and more cultured interests which he must satisfy. "Any picture 
of life", the learned narvard professor poetically assures us, 
"which represents the organism as trimming sail, stopping leaks, 
and storing supplies in order to ride the sea, must fail to con-
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vey the physiognomy o~ man. lt is characteristic o~ him to be 
primarily concerned with the freight that he carries; an~'to 
set sail for distant parts rather than merely to keep afloat. 
~t is this creative and adventurous aspect of life for which 
the narrower biological categories fail to provide. n29 
Unfortunately for rerry, the very same method that he 
employs in rejecting the biological interpretation of value may 
be used against his own psychological view. If the biological 
interpretation is to be discarded because it may not make life 
worth living, so also must the psychological interpretation be 
sacrificed because it may not make civilized life worth liking. 
Certainly it is of far greater value for a man to be interested 
in his self-preservation than to like such products of IIcivi-
lized" society as opium or marijuana. ~o long as we fail to 
look beyond mere liking or disliking, we can never hope to find 
the key to human destiny. 
Another great difficulty of this theory of interest is 
that it makes the ~ oblem of value far too narrow. ~ince in-
terest is to be understood only in te~ of human motor-affec-
tive life, value theory must necessarily exclude the activity 
of animals and plants as well as the inanimate tendencies of 
brute matter. ~he Neo-Thomistic view, however, has an explana-
tion that is broad enough to encompass all the activity of the 
universe. According to this doctrine, one inanimate object 
tends towards another in much the same way as a human being 
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desires the satisfaction of its appetite. Of oourse, there is 
.' no conscious appetite in the brute matter, but only the mate-
rial order and tendencies that are placed within it by a ~u-
preme Intelligence, Who wisely ordains the ~der of the uni-
verse~O ~he thought and the will of inanimate and unintellec-
tual nature is from without, the physical process of tending 
towards its end or goal is from within, but only on account of 
the extrinsic Mind. For everything in the world, from the 
gravitational attraction of two molecules on each other up to 
the noblest desire of the cultured man, value remains in the 
object and 4he desire or attraction for it in the subject. In 
this way ucholasticism is able to offer a consistent and com-
plete explanation of the facts of experience. Interest theory, 
on the other hand, in order to include all grades of being, 
must either materialize conscious life or merge matter into 
mind. 
'J:owards the cl.ose of his chief work on value, t'rofessor 
Perry arrives at the remarkable conclusion that ,jaIl fully 
aroused interests are of equal intensityn~l This st"atement can 
be understood in two senses, one of which, however, is tauto-
logical.~his first interpretation is that a fully aroused 
interest completely exh~usts the capacity of the subject with 
reference to that interest. Obviously this is not the sense 
intended, since the predicate of the proposition is a useless 
repetition of the subject. Lhe second meaning is that the in-
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terest taken in one "object of desire" is always equal to thl:t 
taken in others. unfortunately, this latter interpreaatfbn does 
not appear to fit the facts, since a manls fully aroused in-
terest in something trivial, say in jade ornaments, can sca~ce­
ly equal the intenSity of his concern over self-preservation. 
Another serious difficulty of perry's theory is that 
interest in any object should always precede the acquisition of 
it. ~et such is often not the case in life. J;t'or instance, 
there are many things in wh:i.ch one becomes interested only after 
he has acquired them. Take the young lad who is forced to stu-
dy classical music or the high school student who is forced to 
read good literature. Only after he has acquired great value 
from these objects does this kind of person become interested, 
if indeed he ever does so at all. For Perry, however, training 
endured unwillingly and without at least some enthusiasm can be 
of no value to the recipient • 
.l.'he conflict between his subjective theory of value and 
his realistic exposition of epistemology has occurred to ~ro-
fessor ~erry himself, and by wat of answer he has called the 
32 inference wholly gratuitous. ~et the very explanation of cog-
nition which he offers in defence can be used to refute his 
theory of vaue. "hat he says excellently is that the thing 
known does not really change because it is known, that it was 
knowable all the time, that knowable does not equal known. Now 
if perry had only applied this method to value, he would not 
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have written the formula "X is valuable equals interest is 
taken in X", nor would he have argued that interest conf~s a 
special character on the object.33This desire to maintain an 
objective philosophy of cognition and at the same time to hold 
for a subjective theory of value is but another instance of the 
difficulty that all subjectivists experience in trying to ex-
plain away the undeniable appearance of objective reality. 
~ociological ~xplanation of Value is Inadequate 
~.rry, Alexander and many others make much of the social 
nature of value. ,i4'or them, the individual values must yield to 
those of society. '1'0 Perry, for example, even the will of two-
34 
thirds is sacred, and to Alexander, Sellars, as well as many 
35 
Continental philosophers society is the standard of mind. 
Alexander and Sellars even go so far as to suggest that man 
must now relinquish his hope of a future existence and learn 
to be content with the mere continuance of human ideals, for 
there is now to be had the higher satisfaction of futhering the 
36 
social development of the race. No longer must man seek the 
preservation of the individual, but that of the species. It 
is noteworthy that both Alexander and Sellars admit the fact 
that somehow man must reeducate himself, since this social man-
ner of thinking is not the natural one. Moreover, by means of 
this socialization of value, rerry would explain away his dif-
ficulties over the equal intensity of interest, for in the 
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s'tandardizing of value "interest is added to interest in the 
same objects and these objects derive augmented value fr~m the 
37 
summation of the interests taken in them. 
in the first place, Perry's summation of subjective 
interests in the external object is not easy to comprehend. 
But more important are the unsatisfying conclusions that can 
be reached by this agreement of wills. According to this the-
ory, a trivial thing over which there is a more general con-
cordance of opinion becomes of greater value simply because ot 
that harmony of minds. Over the value of candy, for instance, 
there is great agreement among all classes, young and old. 
tiut over the indissolubility of the marriage tie there is by 
no means a unanimity of opinion, and moreover, a large section 
of mankind - children - is scarcely interested in the question 
at all. ~et according to the sociality view, it would be can-
dy which is of higher value to mankind. .i:his conclusion would 
indeed be true, if there were no intrinsic values independent 
of the subjective preference; but it is certainly erroneous in 
the supposition that there is such objective excellence. ~im-
ilar examples could be multiplied indefinitely, the only pur-
pose of which would be to show how far the subjective view has 
strayed from the path of reality. 
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Subjective Nature or the Relational Theorl 
.' 
At the outset or this chapter we remarked that all the 
modern theories or value which do not approximate the ~cholas-
tic viewpoint can be reduced to subjectivism. ~ndeed, there 
are only two theories or value, the objective or ucholastic 
and the subjective. ',l'he good work done in this rield by tJobn 
Laird, A. ~. Brogan, and others is only an approach towards the 
more complete explanation already evolved by st. Thomas and his 
successors. Now it is not very dirricult to detect the sub-
jective element in .Proressor Alexander's relational theory. 
According to this doctrine, value does not exist in the object 
previous to the subject's relation with it, but is born simul-
taneously with the act or appreciation~8 But ir there is no 
value prior to the subjective state, then the subject must be 
said to conrer the value. lio say that value is only in the 
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subject derivatively is to conruse the issue. .Lhe simple ract 
is that berore the act of appreciation comes into being, there 
is no value. "hether va.lue can be primarily in the relation or 
not, certainly the value or a relation that depends entirely on 
subjective activity is not objective. tlence, the relational 
theory as expounded by Alexander and Sellars is rttndamentally 
the same as the subjective theories or ierry and Mackenzie, and 
must, thererore, labor under all the basic dirficulties or 
their position. 
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Subjective Character of urbanks "Unique Form of Objectivity" 
.' 
'J.'he third principal type of non-Scholastic value theory 
is the so-called objective view of W. M. Urban. In this doc-
trine frofessor Urban wishes'expressly to oppose the subjective 
and the relational views, which he condems as "the supreme in-
40 
anity of interest in the unreal". Unfortunately, however, he 
himself falls into the same error which he so severely criti-
cizes. For him value is "a unique form of objectivity differ-
ing from either existence or subsistence"; it is an irreducible 
form lying between being and non-being.41 With all due respect 
to his desire to escape subjectivism, it is very difficult to 
understand just what this "unique form of objectivity!1 may be 
except a subjective act or state. Professor Urban himself con-
cedes that at first we shall be confused by this new way of 
thinking, since it is contrary to the ordinary way, and that we 
shall find great difficulty in accepting the concept of objec-
tivity without existence.42 
Now the facts of external reality give no evidence of 
a middle between being and not-being13 Everything that!! must 
be called being; that which which is not, must simply be called 
"not-being". Of course, all being is not yet actualized, some 
of it still lies in potency; but inasmuch as it is even in 
potency, it must be regarded as real, and therefore opposed to 
nothing. Since Urban does noc admit potential reality in his 
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unique form, it must remain strictly a subjective conception. 
Neither can he avoid the dilemma by making this unique ~orm a 
quality, since qualities are also being secundum quid and pos-
tulate being simpliciter as a subject of inhaesion. And so, 
~rofessor Urban's own theory of value ultimately develop into 
"the supreme inanity of interest in the unreal". 
Summary 
While many more inconsistencies of the non-Scholastic 
position can be discovered and discussed with profit, yet these 
outstanding weaknesses are sufficient to establish our argu-
ment. Subjective value theory, which begins by lay!ng its 
foundations on the insecure ground of contemporary scientific 
method and Kantianism, is not any more fortunate in the condi-
tion of its superstructure. Here we find that all the diffi-
culties of the subjective Kantian basis becomes accentuated the 
farther upward we proceed, until it is quite clear that such a 
system cannot survive in reality. Between the evidence of the 
external world and the subjective theory of value the gulf is 
ever growing wider and wider, so that little hope for an un-
derstanding of the problem of value remains to the non-Scho-
lastics unless they abandon their present approach. 
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CHAP'l'B1{ VII 
VALUE AND GOD .' 
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In the three preceding chapters we have seen how non-
~cholastic theories of value are insufficient both from the 
viewpoint of historical premises and also from that of current 
conclusions. '.1.'0 complete our criticism we ought to apply the 
principles of subjective value theory to other fields of thought 
and human endeavor. ~ince value theory is or ought to be part 
of general metaphysics, its conclusions should be available as 
fundamental principles for the other sciences. if on the other 
hand, the application of these principles to other fields leads 
to inacceptable consequences, then one may seriously doubt the 
validity of the principles them8elves. In the case of sub-
jective value theory, this discovery will only amount to a 
third main line of refutation. 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to consider the 
pr~mary concept of value and not the various grades in the 
scale of values, we shall not mncern ourselves here with the 
proximate standards necessary to art, economics, politics, and 
. other intermediate sciences, but shall leap from the fUndamen-
tal theory to itsexplanation of the highest value - namely, God. 
It is in its explanation of the place that God must hold in the 
universe that the fUll consequences of subjective value theory 
are brought to light. Let us, then, briefly review the various 
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opinions of the leading subjective valuists, in order to see 
how completely they have revolted fI'om traditional philoS'ophi-
cal thought on the matter of a ~upreme Being. 
For ~erry God is definitely not a person, since to make 
him such would be to deny him the right to be himself~ Assur-
edly, this opinion places the strangest of possible interpreta-
tions on personality. But waiving that point, let us see just 
what God is. In .ferry's theory God is "a harmony of wills" 
resulting from the fact that persons live in concord. He is 
indeed a being far exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent 
on man for his existence. He is the name of legitimate aspira-
tion, which, however, is not yet actualized. '.rhus .Perry agrees 
with Alexander that Dod is an emergent deity. For Alexander, 
God is in the strictest sense a creature, who is somehow to be 
distinguished from ItDelty".2 Deity in his system is the next 
step in the evolution of space-time. In the past matter, life, 
human mind were all in their turn deity; but now deity is out in 
front again. uod, on the other hand is the whole world as pos-
3 
sessing the quality of deity. Just as space is the body with 
reference to time as the mind, so the world is the body of God 
and deity is his mind. Mackenzie and ~ellars also accept the 
finite god of space-time.4 urban, on the other hand, is non-
committal. He does not deny the existence of a ~upreme Being, 
but Simply ignores it~ tiuch, then, are the outstanding sub-
jective theories with regard to uod. 'l'hough perhaps differing 
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at times in details, they are ror the most part in agreement 
~ that uod is not an Absolute Being, but a rinite becoming; that 
He is not a person, nor even actual, but is strictly provision-
al and dependent on man. ne is indeed a convenient ~od, at 
once emergent, pragmatic, physical, or anything else that the 
will or, we should rather say, the whim or man desires. 
The Modern Uod, a Kantian Creation 
Bince we have already indicated the great debt that 
value theory owes in other respects to Kantian metaphysics, it 
will be interesting to see precisely what basis the modern 
idea of ~od has in that earlier system. ~Tom the theoretical 
philosophy or Kant arises the contemporary tendency to explain 
our knowled@B or tiod as anti-intellectual and emotional. ~h1s 
a~titude is clearly demonstrated throughout the latter part or 
Alexander's Space, Time,and Deitz, wherein the approach to 
6 deity is regarded as primarily one or sentiment and imagination. 
~'rom the practical philosophy or Kant modern valuists derive 
their pragmatic interpretation of God, for Kant himselr declares 
that the ~upreme oeing is only an hypothesis and a regulative 
7 
Those modern philosophers, such as Mackenzie~ who wish norm. 
to exclude God altogether rrom the rield or metaphysics, can 
justiry their stand in the Kantian idea that God is real only 
insomuch as He is use£Ul. Thus He becomes non-existent ror 
those who cannot find any value in !lim. Again, the contempor-
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ary anthropomorphic exposition of the nature of ~od is the 
direct result of the Kantian doctrine on the will. .' uinc e the 
human faaulty can never know any spiritual object towards which 
it can aspire, it must ever remain on the strictly human level 
and uod, therefore, will never be greater in dignity than man 
himself. Because of its insistence on the non-objective ap-
proach to God, Kantian philosophy is also largely responsible 
for the current prevalence of agnosticism, in which anyone's 
guess is as good as anyone elsels, since there would be no ob-
jective control of subjective sentiment and opinion. 
',L,he same argwnents that were employed in Ohapter V to 
reject the Kantian groundwork of all metaphysics are 'equally 
applicable to his concept of liod and, therefore, need not be 
repeated at length. 'l'he fundamental fallacy of .Kant i s whole 
system is his gratuitous assumption that the muman mind is a 
measure, and not a.thing measured. ~o this view ~t. Thomas and 
all his followers stand resolutely opposed, since it inverts 
9 the entire evidence of experience. For Kant the mind projects 
empty ~rms on sense experience and is, therefore, the creator 
of its own intellectual perceptions. ucholasticism, on the 
other hand, holdS that the mind is measured and informed by ex-
ternal reality, which owes its existence, not to menls thinking, 
but to a ~upreme Being Who is the Creator and Conservor of all 
10 , things. ,ii'or Kant the prac tic al will confers good on 0 bj ec ts 
according to their value to the subject, as, for example, on 
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God, Who is needed to give permanance to moral standards. 
~t. Thomas on the other hand maintains that the good whi~ the 
will discovers in creatures is ultimately a reflection of the 
11 Divine Goodness Who made them. 
The Fallacy of Lnverted Helationa 
'1'he total consequence of this Kantian groundwork and 
its contemporary expression in subjective value theory is what 
Dr. Fulton ~heen aptly calls "the fallacy of inverted rela-
12 
tions". According to traditional thought the real dependence 
in the relation between uod and creature is in the creature; 
but in modern philosophy this order has been inverted so th~ 
God becomes the dependent, the provisional time-server of man. 
~hus the earlier theocentric interpretation of religion has 
yielded to a current egocentric philosophy. '1'0 show that this 
latter concept of the relation between uod and creatures is a 
fallacy, one need only to apply the principle of causality and 
immediately the untenability of the view becomes evident. 
Modern valuists must admit that either uod or creatures, or 
more definitely man, is the cause of the other. '1'0 deny out-
right the principle of causality would be to embrace agnosti-
cism and thereby render discussion impossible. 
,!tlor this reason, subjective value theorists are com-
mitted to the position that man is the cause of uod. Nowwhat 
is the consequence of this view? According to its premises, 
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man comes first and uod, if He exists at all, follows from 
.' man's efforts. 'l'hus man becomes the creator or in a word, LTod 
Himself, which is a complete inversion of the doctrine of Scho-
lastics. ~t will not help our adversaries to argue that uod 
and creatures exist before man, and that man merely confers 
value on them. li'or if God exists before man and all other 
creatures, ue has the power over them, and not they over tlim, 
since He has the power first. Few value theorists have attempt 
ed to escape by postulating the previous existence of a value-
less uod. Rather they faankly admit their inability to ex-
plain the origin of things and are content with a limited god 
at the end rather than at the beginning of the universe~3 'l'he 
great difficulty of this doctrine is that, by failing to ac-
count for the beginning of things, it makes discussion about 
their end philosophically useless. 
Illogicality of the ~ragmatic View of God 
'rhe pragmatic view of God makes Him at all times varia-
ble and contingent and now and then rejects nim altogether, ac-
cording to whatever value the individual may find in Him at the 
moment. Now to treat the concept of God in this way is as il-
logical as to hold that two and two equal four only now and then 
if perhaps for the convenience of my problem, ~ see fit to make 
two and two equal five or seven, 1 may get an answer, but I 
shall not have any guarantee that my answer is either right or 
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wrong, and all the probabilities are in favor of its being 
.' wrong. ~ince God is the Sufficient Reason for all things and 
the ultimate expaanation of their or~gin and final destiny, 
He is always necessary and invariable}.4.1.,or there never will 
come a day when one does not need a sufficient reason for real-
ity. 
The illogicality of the pragmatic view of value can be 
further seen from three possible attitudes that this theory 
may take with regard to the nature of uod. Either God exists 
all the time, and then utterly to disregard Him now and then 
because He may not be useful at the moment, is exceedingly 
rash; or tie does not exist at all, and then to be concerned 
about Him is in one sense hypocrisy and in any sense the height 
of folly. For why should one be troubled over the power of a 
non-entity? To say that one should act as if uod exists is as 
hypocritical and as foolish as to say that one should act as if 
one has one's daily bread. 'l'his last attitude may be likened 
to that of a sick man who is willing to accept his poor rela-
tions in secret, but is ashamed to acknowledge them in public, 
and is indeed a shabby way of smuggling uod in through the back 
door after ne has been ejected through the front. Or again, 
it may mean that man must satisfy his wants with his own imag-
ings, which is surely a fatal process. 'J:he third possibility 
is that uod exists now and then, whenever and howsoever man 
sees fit to make ~im. Since we have already considered the 
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weakness of this argument, it would seem that the pragmatic at-
.' titude of the value theory insofar as it concerns ~od is not 
founded on logic or experience. 
A great deal today is made of the affective rather than 
the intellectual perception of uod. In one respect this emo-
tional approach is due to ~rotestant Pietism and in another to 
a failure to distinguish between confused and reflex knowledge. 
It is quite true that we do not immediately acquire very clear 
ideas about the nature of uod. But the mere fact that our 
primitive concept of the uupreme Being is quite confused, does 
not detract from its genuinely intellectual character. As to 
the emotional nature of pe:r:'ception, a serious difficulty im-
mediately arises when it is applied to tiod. Emotions vary 
greatly in kind, frequency, and intensity - both in individu-
als as well as in society. ~uch an inconstant element can neve 
provide the permanence and constancy that is required for the 
concept of the Sufficient Reason of all things, and must, there 
fore, be abandoned as an explanation of our knowledge of God. 
Attempted Sociological Escape from Egocentric heligion 
'llhe subj ecti ve concept of '-Tod is indeed supremely flat-
tering to a man in whom the will to power has grown excessive, 
since it makes man the hub and center of the universe and its 
fundamental cause. Let somehow the human heart rebels at the 
apothesis of the ego. ~ven the most selfish men must at times 
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be dissatisfied with the imperfections and sin in their nature • 
. ' 
tto make such miserable beings as men so often discover them-
selves to be the acme of achievement is the bitterest irony, 
from which the human mind rightly revolts. vur limited intel-
lects may not understand many things6 but even the simplest 
savage cannotniil to realize that what he wants in uod is sane-
thing higher and nobler than himself, something towards which 
i his will can aspire. 
~t is, perhaps, to this desire that the sociological 
aspect of the highest value owes its popularity. ~he subjec-
tive valuist, not wishing to relinquish his fundamental posi-
tion, and yet seeking an escape from the narrowness of an ego-
centric religion, turns towards society as the solution of his 
problem. ~hus ~od is not the individual man, but rather the 
ideal object of an ideal willlln which the agreement of even a 
. 16 plurality of society is sacred. 
While this theory may be an agreeable evasion of the 
difficultY6 it is certainly nt an answer. iI'or as Perry him-
self admits this unanimity of wills - alas. - does not now ex-
I ist and will p-robably never be realized~ 7 tle explains his use 
of the regretful interjection tlalas " by saying that the unami-
mity ought to exist, because it is so sorely needed. However, 
the same objection thaa is urged against the individual's being 
God, can be applied with greater cogency to the sociological 
view. 1J0ciety is nothing more than a collection of imperfect 
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individuals, the summation of which cannot be better than its 
.' separate components. .hus God as divinized society may be a 
palliative to the subjectivist's conscience, but never a justi-
fication of his philosophy. 
by showing in this chapter how the application of the 
subjective theory of value to the notion of God and therefore 
to that of religion in general leads to inacceptable conse-
quences, we have established a third main line of argument for 
its rejection. ~he same method could be imployed in analyzing 
the immediate aciences. uowever, since the purpose of this 
thesis is only to consider the fundamental philosophy of value. 
and since the application of its principles to one science -
or, for example, that of religion - is sufficient to demonstrate 
their logical outcome, it will not be necessary to consider the 
other sciences in order to establish our argument. 
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CHAPll'Ef{ VIII 
'fllli FlJTURE OF VALU~ PHILOSOPHY .' 
Now that we have considered the non-Scholas.tic theory of 
value both from the viewpoint of its origin in empirical science 
and Kantian theory of knwledge, and from that of its present 
conclusions, as well as its application to the ultimate philos-
ophy of uod, the only task remaining for us is to draw some in-
ferences as to its future. 
unfortunately, the prospect for value theory does not 
at present offer much encouragement. uubjeotive value philoso-
phy is indeed in a truly sad plight. 01' failing to account for 
the data of everyday experience, it puzzles the thinker who is 
seeking a satisfactory explanation of ~oximate reality_ ~y 
professing ignorance as to the origin of the universe, it leaves 
the question of ultimate reality a profound mystery, which is 
most distressing to the human mind in its quest for truth. by 
destroying or perverting the concept of uod to such an extent 
that it is no longer intelligible, it deprives men of the in-
dispensable consolation of rel~gion_ By making deity dependent 
on the will of man, it takes away that Providence towards which 
the unfortunate creature is want to turn in his hour of misery_ 
As a result, the successful man should tend to overwhelming 
pride ad the unsuccessful man to blackest despair. moreover, 
the prospect of a future existence either disappears or is ren-
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dered exceedingly vague, since the reality of such a state de-
pends on the power of the valuing subject1s will, a will Which 
so often fails in the most ordinary things. Subjective value 
theory, too, by underminging those ethical sanctions whose 
value is derived from the absolute justice of a ~upreme Law-
giver, leads to moral scepticism. ~hus, without the penalties 
of restitution, capital and labor need not fear their excesses, 
nor need the sinner any longer dread the oDnsequences of hi. 
transgressions. The present day unconcern and even contempt 
for the marrilge bond and the duty of providing for the care of 
children can find its philosophical justification in the sub-
jective attitude of contemporary value theory. Finally, it be-
comes evident that philosophy is no longer serviceable to the 
average man for the solution of his problems, since the logical 
I development of the premises of the subjective theory of value 
will serve only to render life meaningless. Therefore, the 
only course open to the wise, but "unphilosophical" man is to 
abandon such idee speculation for the clear light of common 
sense. 
The non-Scholastic position is not, however, utterly 
hopeless. In the first pkce, there is a minority of no incon-
siderable merit who are strenuously attacking the doctrines of 
their confreres and are themselves championing same views that 
approximate Thomism. Among these the most outstanding are 
John Laird in England and A. P. Brogan in America; but happily 
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they are not alone in their crusade against subjective or other-
wise untenable theories of value. .' In the second place, the 
subjective valuists themBelves are not satisfied with their own 
theories. Quite recently, W. M. Urban admitted that the prob-
lem still remains unsolved, that the reconciliation between ex-
istence and value, for which he so ardently hoped at the con-
clusion of his earlier work, is not yet in view! Perry, too, 
frankly acknowledges that his theory is "adjoined on all sides 
by thickets abounding in monstrous doubts and ilifficulties ft , 
and that he would fain have untangled the many complications 
2 
which beset his position. Moreover, all of the, have confessed 
their inability to explain the ultimate origin of things, a 
question whiCh no sincere thinker can afford to leave unanswered 
So long as these non-Scholastics remain free from an attitude 
of utter complacency in their errors, it isnot too much to ex-
pect some improvement. 
Here is where Neo-Thomism must step in and play the 
part of wise and experienced guide. Against the undertainty 
and obscurities of subjective theory, the doctrine of st. 
Thomas, scientifically enriched and amplified gy its modern 
protagonists, stands firm and clear. lts principles are thor-
oughly sane, permanent, and objective in their explanation of 
the problems of life. These principles are sane because they 
are not founded on a priori speculation, but on the data of 
common sense. '.I.:hey are permanent and objective because they 
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are not based on an emotional evaluation of subjective states 
of mind, but on a rational exposition of the activity of the 
external world. Lastly, by offering a satisfactory explanation 
of the problems of existence and especially of human existence, 
they aff~ the mind a haven where it can be secure in its much 
desired rest. 
'1'0 subjective value theory, .:::icholastic philosophy can 
render a second service of the utmost importance, by formula-
ting a fixed termlnology for it. If the definite language of 
the SChoolmen had been applied to modern speculation, vv. H. 
Sheldon would not have been able to complain that all current 
definitions of value are useless, and ueorge Santayana would 
not have needed to cry out in despair at the futility of philo--
sophical discussion. In opposition to the Babel of figurative 
terms and personal fancies, the Scholastic system can offer an 
established vocabulary that is also capable of sound and ample 
expansion. 
Very encouraging, too, is the fact that modern valuists 
seem to be genuinely desirous of philosophival relations with 
Scholastics. Perry on his part deeply regrets the lack of con-
tact between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy in this coun-
try, and sincerely hopes that both sides by speaking out their 
differences will come to a better understanding of each other~ 
From across the sea Alexander in England voices the same ppin-
ion. Indeed, many of the modern non-Scholastics lay the fault 
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pf the unpopularity of Scholastic doctrine chiefly to the at-
titude of its own exponents. It is, therefore, high time that 
the champions of Neo-Thomism should no longer be content to 
enjoy among themselves the satisfaction of their own system, 
but should also be eager to share it with others who may wish 
for a better understanding of reality. Perhaps, through a more 
intimate contact in future discussions with non-Scholastics, 
Neo-Thomisties can turn philosophy back from its subjective 
wanderings and once more establish the supremacy of the philo-
sophia perennia of Aristotle and St. Thomas. In that philoso-
phy alone do we see any genuine promise for a theory of value. 
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